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I. TECHNICAL DETAILS ON OUR ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
In this section, we clarify the conditions under which our econometric specification  
is a consistent estimator of the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to permanent and 
transitory shocks to price and income.  In the discussion that follows, we abstract from the use of 
“first dollar” price variables as instruments for current price and lagged changes in price, and we 
focus on the specification where we use one-period future changes in price and income.  To 
simplify the notation, we define git, pit, and yit as the residual variation in log charitable giving, 
log price, and log first-dollar after-tax income, respectively, after regressing them on the fixed 
effects, time dummies, and exogenous covariates.  In that case, the equation we would like to 
estimate is: 
 
(A.1) git =  β1Δpit-1 + β2Δpit + β3 (pit) + β4Eit(Δpit+1)  
 +  β5Δyit-1 + β6Δyit + β7(yit) + β8Eit(Δyit+1) 
  +   μit.  
 
Here, Eit(.) signifies individual i’s expectation at time t of the variable inside the parentheses, and 
μit represents a random error term.  In reality, we as econometricians cannot observe an 
individual’s expectation at time t of a future change in price or income, but rather observe the 
actual change in future price and income that is realized; we will address this with an 
instrumental variables strategy that will be explained later, and everything we say below depends 
on having valid instruments for expected future changes in price and income.  We wish to allow 
for stochastic processes for the evolution of prices and incomes that involve three types of 
shocks: (1) transitory shocks that dissipate after one period; (2) persistent shocks that are a 
surprise at the time they begin to affect price or income; and (3) persistent shocks to price or 
income that are anticipated one period in advance.  To do this, let us assume that the residual 
variation in the log price of charity evolves according to the following relationship: 
 
(A.2)   pit = pit-1 + uit + vit + eit - eit-1,  
   3
where uit is a permanent shock occurring at time t that individual i does not anticipate at time t-1; 
vit is a permanent shock occurring at time t that individual i does anticipate at time t-1; and eit is a 
transitory shock that lasts one period and then disappears at time t+1.  Let us also allow for an 
analogous stochastic process for the residual variation in income, where shocks to income are 
distinguished from their analogous shocks to price by a y superscript. 
 










These stochastic processes are similar to those specified in Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002) 
except that we allow for future persistent shocks that are anticipated one period before they occur 
(the v’s). 
 If  A.2 and A.3 characterize the stochastic processes for residual log price and residual log 
income, then by substitution we can re-express equation A.1 in terms of the various transitory 
and permanent shocks in equation A.4 below: 
 
(A.4) git =  β1(uit-1 + vit-1 + eit-1 – eit-2) + β2(uit + vit + eit – eit-1)  
+ β3 [pi0 + eit  + Σ =
t
s 0(uis + vis)] + β4(vit+1 - eit)  
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  +   μit, 
where pi0 and yi0 represent the initial conditions for residual log price and residual log income, 
respectively, for individual i.  To demonstrate our claim in the paper that β3 is an estimator of the 
effect of a change in price that has persisted for at least three periods (t-2, t-1, and t) and is not 
expected to reverse itself in the future, take the partial derivative of equation A.4 with respect to 
uit-2, which is precisely a shock to price that has already persisted for three periods and is not 
expected to reverse itself in the future: 
 
(A.5)   ∂git / ∂uit-2 = β3 
   4
More generally, β3 estimates the elasticity of charitable giving at time t with respect any 
permanent shock to log price (u and v) from any prior period up to and including period t-2.  
Moreover, if equations A.1 and A.2 together accurately characterize the demand function for 
current charitable giving and the stochastic process for price, then the persistent shocks from t-2 
and earlier are the only kinds of shocks to price that contribute the identification of β3.  The fact 
that we have included the lagged and future price changes in the specification controls for all of 
the other shocks (whether transitory or permanent) that affect current charitable giving.  The only 
remaining independent variation in current price once we control for the lagged and lead changes 
in price comes from persistent shocks that occurred before t-2.   
The inclusion of lagged changes in price and income in our specification allows the short-
run effect on charitable giving of a permanent shock to price or income to differ from its long-
run effect.  The short-run and long-run effects may differ, for example, because of gradual 
learning.  Such an effect is intuitively plausible, especially considering that some of the variation 
in price during our sample period arose from complicated tax reforms, involving rather non-
transparent changes in the alternative minimum tax, limitations on itemized deductions involving 
byzantine calculations, and complicated interactions between federal and state income taxes.  
Presumably it may have taken taxpayers some time to begin to understand the implications of 
these changes for their incentives to give to charity.  To see how this is addressed in our 
specification, consider for example the effect on current charitable giving of a new permanent 
shock to price, uit.  The partial derivative of equation A.4 with respect to uit is: 
 
(A.6)   ∂git / ∂uit = β2 + β3 
 
Empirically, we find that β3 is negative, as we should expect since it is a price elasticity.  In most 
specifications we find that our estimate of β2 is positive and statistically different from zero.  
This suggests that the absolute value of the price elasticity of a new permanent shock to 
charitable giving is smaller than the elasticity of charitable giving to older permanent shocks, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that there is gradual learning about changes to the tax 
law.   
  The effect of a one period transitory shock to price can be found by taking the partial 
derivative of equation A.4 with respect to eit, which yields:   5
 
(A.7)   ∂git / ∂eit = β2 + β3 – β4 
 
This corresponds to what Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter call the “transitory price elasticity.” 
The effect of a future shock to price that is anticipated in advance can be found by taking 
the partial derivative of equation A.4 with respect to vit+1, which yields: 
 
(A.8)   ∂git / ∂vit+1 = β4 
 
Analogous procedures can be used to show that β7 estimates the effect on current charitable 
giving of a permanent shock to income (u
y or v
y) occurring in any prior period up to and 
including t-2.  The short-run effect on current charitable giving of a new permanent shock to 
price is estimated by β6 + β7.  The transitory income elasticity is estimated by β6 + β7 – β8, and 
the elasticity of current giving with respect to an anticipated future increase in income is given 
by β8. 
  In this framework, it is easy to see the potential sources of bias in the previous literature.  
In the traditional cross-sectional literature, only the current price was included the specification.  
The coefficient on current price in such a specification would be a biased estimator of β3, 
because the expected future price change is an omitted variable that affects current charitable 
giving and is correlated with current price.  In our framework, the expected future price change is 
definitely correlated with current price because current price contains eit and expected future 
price change contains –eit.  In addition, the other component of the expected future price change, 
vit+1, is likely to be correlated with current price as well.  Figure 1 in the text, which illustrates 
the time path of the price of charitable giving in different income classes, demonstrates why.   
Tax reforms over the past few decades have tended to change prices a lot more for people with 
low prices (that is, high-income people) than for people with high prices (low- and middle-
income people).   This creates a systematic relationship between the size of anticipated future 
price changes caused by tax reform and current price.  In such a case, a specification that fails to 
account for predictable future persistent changes in price that are induced by tax reform can be 
expected to yield inconsistent estimates of the persistent price elasticity, whereas our 
specification would produce consistent estimates.   6
  An important challenge is that we do not observe the individual’s expectation at time t of 
the future changes in price and income.  We treat the change in future price and income that is 
actually realized after-the-fact as a measurement, with error, of the individual’s time t 
expectation of those changes.  If the resulting measurement error around the expectation is 
classical measurement error (mean zero white noise), and if we can find a valid instrument, then 
we can apply the standard instrumental variables remedy for errors-in-variables bias.   
If price and income evolve according to the stochastic process we specified in equations 
A.2 and A.3, then we can express the realized change in future residual variation in log price 
Δpit+1 and realized change in future residual variation in log income Δyit+1 as: 
 
(A.9)   Δpit+1 = (vit+1 – eit) + (uit+1 + eit+1) 
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it+1) represent the measurement error in 
the realized future price change and income change variables that we include in our regression.  









it+1), and that meet the other standard criteria for 
good instruments.  For this to fit the classical measurement error model, the future unanticipated 




it+1 must be mean zero random errors that are uncorrelated with the 
exogenous instruments in our system, which is essentially the same assumption made in Auten, 
Sieg, and Clotfelter.   
We argue that there is some portion of the expected future change in price that is 
predictable and knowable by the econometrician, and we construct an instrument meant to 
capture that predictable portion.  One source of predictable future change in price is a tax reform 
that can be anticipated in advance of its implementation, for example because it was enacted 
before the year when it began to take effect, because it is gradually phased-in over time, or 
because it was part of the campaign platform of a politician who was elected before the end of 
the year.  Another source of predictable changes in future prices is predictable demographic 
changes that have tax consequences – for instance, turning age 65 can be predicted in advance,   7
and provides the taxpayer with various federal and state tax benefits that could push the taxpayer 
into a different marginal rate bracket; having a child can be predicted about 9 months in advance, 
and also yields numerous tax benefits.  A third source of predictable price changes arises from 
that fact that price is a complicated non-linear function Pit(Y’it), where Pit(.) is the individual- and 
time-specific function that transforms pre-tax income into price, and Y’it is pre-tax income.  
Since price is a function of marginal tax rates that depend on taxable income rather than pre-tax 
income, we are treating the characteristics that affect the relationship between pre-tax and 
taxable income, such as marital status, number of children, various and deductions as a share of 
pre-tax income, as part of the Pit(.) function.  Some portion of the future change in income is 
predictable based on the set of exogenous variables in our system, for example due to life-cycle 
factors and mean reversion in income over time.  To the extent these affect price in a linear 
fashion, we cannot distinguish their effects through from the independent direct effects.  Because 
Pit(.) is a known non-linear function that varies greatly across time and across individuals due to 
tax reforms and individual characteristics such as state of residence, marital status, personal 
deductions, and so forth, predictable changes in future income due to these exogenous variables 
create predictable changes in price that are both independent of the linear effects of the 
exogenous variables and separately identifiable.  Our primary instrument for future change in log 
price is: 
 
(A.11) lnP*it+1(Y’it + eγˆ Zit
 ) - lnPit(Y’it) 
 
lnP*it+1(.) is the log price function constructed at time t+1 using actual tax law applying at time 
t+1, which is assumed to be known as of time t due to lags between the time when the law is 
enacted and implemented, gradual phase-ins, predictability due to election in year t, etc.   
Demographic factors involved in the P*it+1 function that affect the transformation of pre-tax 
income into taxable income are assumed to be known in advance as well, for example because 
age, and number of children in the future, are generally predictable in advance.
1  We also assume 
in constructing P*it+1 that individual deductions and components of income are equal to 
predicted pre-tax income times the average share of individual deductions and income 
                                                      
1 Changes in marital status do not come into play because when marital status changes, the taxpayer is treated as a 
different taxpaying unit.   8
components in overall pre-tax income over the previous three years.  Y’it is pre-tax income at 
time t, and eγˆ Zit is the predicted change in pre-tax income from a regression where the 
dependent variable is change in log pre-tax income between t and t+1, and the vector of 
explanatory variables Zit includes the full set of exogenous variables in the system that would be 
known to the individual and the econometrician at time t -- that is, the exogenous variables in 
equation (1), not including year dummies and time dummies, and the full set of excluded 
instruments.
2  As a sensitivity analysis, we also try using a simpler instrument constructed by 
calculating ΔlnPit+1 holding real income and all inputs into the tax calculator constant in real 
terms at their year t values, so that the variation in the instrument is driven entirely by tax 
reforms. 
There is some portion of (vit+1 – eit) that cannot be explained by our full set of instruments 
Zit in a linear first stage regression; we’ll call that unexplainable part wit+1. The wit+1 could 
include, for example, the effects of private information about future shocks such as a raise that an 
individual anticipates in advance, or it could reflect some degree of imperfect foresight about 
next year’s tax law.  Based on the standard properties of instrumental variables estimators, 
consistent estimation does not require that our instrument explains all of the predictable change 
in price, only that it is correlated with that predictable change in price, is uncorrelated with the 
measurement error (uit+1 + eit+1), and is uncorrelated with εit, the error term in equation (1).   
Our primary instrument for change in future first-dollar after-tax log income is the 
predictable change in average tax rate, where average tax rate is defined as the individual’s total 
income tax liability divided by pre-tax income.  This is motivated by the fact that: 
  
(A.12)  lnYit = lnY’it + ln[1-ATRit(Y’it)], 
 
where lnYit is log after-tax income, lnY’it is log pre-tax income, and ATRit(.) is the average tax 
rate as a function of pre-tax income.  So basically, this uses the predictable future change in tax 
                                                      
2 We omit the individual fixed effects and year dummies because including them would presume perfect foresight 
about mean income for an individual over years included in the sample, and average change in income over the next 
year for the sample.  Although we are controlling for these separately in a linear fashion, feeding them through the 
Pit function would introduce non-linear functions of them into the instrument set, and so would independently 
contribute to identification, which would violate our requirement that the instruments be uncorrelated with the 
forecast error.  In the income prediction equation, we replace these with year t values of age and a dummy variable 
for marital status, which are normally omitted because the combination of fixed effects and year effects control for 
them.   9
liability as an instrument for the future change in after-tax income.  We construct our future 
change in average tax rate instrument in a manner analogous to the future change in price 
instrument, so the instrument is: 
 
(A.13) ln[1-ATR*it+1(Y’it + eγˆ Zit)] – ln[1-ATRit(Y’it)] 
 
Here, ATR*it+1(.) is the predicted function that transforms pre-tax income into an average tax rate 
for time t+1, constructed in a manner analogous to P*it+1(.). The identifying assumptions are that 









it+1), and is uncorrelated with εit, the 
error term in equation (1). 
  As noted in the text, we also use the time t marginal tax rate on capital gains and the 
predictable future change in marginal tax rate on capital gains as excluded instruments, since 
these should be another arguably exogenous source of persistent and transitory shocks to income 
and price, and should only influence charitable giving through their influence on income and 
price.  We construct the instrument for future change in marginal tax rate on capital gains in a 
manner analogous to what we do for price and average tax rate in A.11 and A.12. 
  Note that in the regressions used to construct the predictable future change in future log 
pre-tax income, γˆZit, the set of explanatory variables Zit includes the full set of exogenous 
instruments, including instruments for the future change in price, future change in average tax 
rate, and future change in mtrcg themselves.  The rationale for including the future tax change 
variables is that they are meant to capture the effects of anticipated tax reforms on income 
dynamics – for instance, exogenous predictable changes in future tax rates due to tax reform are 
another source of predictable changes in future income if people retime income in response to 
the incentives to do so. For these initial income prediction regressions, we construct those future 
tax change instruments by holding an individual’s real pre-tax income and all other inputs into 
the tax calculator constant in real terms at year t values. 
  In sum, the above analysis suggests that as long as we have valid instruments for future 
price and income changes, our econometric specification provides a consistent estimator of the 
elasticity of charitable giving with respect to permanent and transitory shocks to price and 
income under reasonable assumptions about the stochastic processes for price and income.     10
To check on this, we constructed simulated data where log price follows the stochastic 
process specified in equation A.2, and where we know the true values of the various shocks 
involved and the true relationship between charitable giving and these shocks, and then run a 
regression analogous to our econometric specification to see if it recovers the parameters of 
interest.  The simulated data was constructed from 21,303 observations on log price of giving 
from the 1979-90 IRS / University of Michigan public use individual tax panel (which are simply 
used to provide initial conditions for price).  We then use a random number generator to create 
simulated random shocks to price and charitable giving for each individual for a sufficient 
number of years to produce an estimation sample with ten years of data for each individual, 
according to the following equations: 
 
(A.14) git =  0.05Δpit-1 + 0.1Δpit -0.5 pit + 1.1Eit(Δpit+1) + μit 
(A.15) E it(Δpit+1) = vit+1 - eit 
(A.16)  pit = pit-1 + uit + vit + eit + eit-1 
(A.17)  vit+1 = 0.5zit + wit 
(A.18) wit = -0.05pit + ηit 
 
Following our earlier notation, g is residual log giving, p is residual log price, μit is random error 
in the giving equation, v is a persistent shock to log price that is anticipated one period in 
advance, u is a persistent shock to price that is not anticipated in advance, and e is a transitory 
one-period shock to log price that is expected to disappear next period.  The zit is our instrument 
for the predictable future persistent shock to price vit+1, which is imperfectly correlated with the 
true vit+1; wit is the error in the instrument’s prediction of vit+1. Equation A.18 allows the 
anticipated future persistent shock to price to be negatively and imperfectly correlated with 
current price, which as discussed above seems likely given the nature of tax reforms in the U.S. 
during our sample period. In the simulation, the μit, vit+1, eit, zit are all random draws from a 
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of 0.1, and the shock ηit is a random 
draw from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of 0.05.  We chose the 
parameters in equation A.14 to allow for a situation where the transitory price elasticity is much 
larger than the persistent price elasticity, which is the case where the bias from failing to account 
for anticipated future price changes would be the greatest.  In this simulation, the true persistent   11
price elasticity is -0.5 and the true transitory price elasticity is -1.5, which correspond to 
Randolph’s characterization of his preferred estimates.     
In column (1) of Table A.1, we show estimates from a version of equation A.14 where 
Eit(Δpit+1) is replaced with Δpit+1, and where we use zit as the excluded instrument for Δpit+1, 
which matches the specification we use in the text (after partialing out the effects of other 
covariates), provided we have a valid instrument.  The 2SLS estimates in column (1) confirm 
that when we have a valid instrument such as zit for the expected future price change, we recover 
the parameters of the true relationship shown in equation A.14, with some very small deviations 
due to the random noise in the simulation. In column (2), we use the same data to estimate the 
same equation but without the future price change.  The estimated persistent price elasticity in 
that specification, at -0.589, is larger than the true value of -0.5, which demonstrates that if there 
are anticipated future persistent shocks to price that are correlated with current price, and people 
are highly responsive to those anticipated future shocks, then failing to account for those 
anticipated future shocks biases the absolute value of the estimated persistent price elasticity 
upwards.  In an exercise not shown in Table A.1, we also tried a simulation that was similar in all 
respects except that the anticipated future persistent price shock (vit+1) is not correlated with 
current price. In other words, the simulation was the same in all respects except that -0.05pit was 
removed from equation A.17.  In that simulation, when we estimated a regression equivalent to 
column (2) in Table A.1, the coefficients on the lagged price changes were biased, but the 
coefficient on current price was not.  This makes sense, because in that simulation, the omitted 
variable (future price change) is only correlated with current price because the future price 
change contains -eit, the negative of the time t transitory shock, and a specification that includes 
Δpt already controls for eit, removing the bias.  But, in the more realistic case where the 
anticipated future persistent price shocks are correlated with current price, column (2) of Table 
A.1 demonstrates that simply controlling for Δpt is not adequate to eliminate the bias.   12
Table A.1 -- Estimates of equation A.14 using simulated data 






changes in price 
Current price 
only 
Δpt-1   0.049 -0.036   
  (0.002)*** (0.002)***   
Δpt  0.098 -0.207   
  (0.003)*** (0.002)***   
pt   -0.502 -0.589 -0.638 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Δpt+1  1.095    
  (0.008)***    
Constant -0.001  -0.004  -0.020 
 (0.001)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Observations  213,030 213,030 213,030 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Finally, column (3) of Table A.1 displays an estimate using the simulated data 
corresponding to equations (A.14) – (A.18) above (with anticipated persistent future price shocks 
that are correlated with current price), but where the regression that we estimate only includes 
current price.  Now the coefficient on current price is -0.638, suggesting that it is an even more 
biased estimator of the persistent price elasticity.  This makes sense, since the once lagged price 
change was reducing the bias by controlling for the transitory shock. 
  The simulation confirms that failing to allow for anticipated future price shocks that are 
correlated with current price biases estimates of the persistent price elasticity.  It also confirms 
that our estimation procedure will produce consistent estimates if our characterization of the 
stochastic processes and relationships between various shocks and charitable giving are correct, 
and if we have valid instruments for the anticipated future price shock.  Another interesting 
lesson from the simulation is that even when the transitory price elasticity is much larger than the 
persistent price elasticity and the magnitude of shocks that create differences between current 
and expected future prices is large, the degree of bias in a specification that just includes the 
current price is not that large.  We have not carefully calibrated our simulation to ensure that the 
magnitudes of the various shocks are empirically realistic, so one should not draw strong 
conclusions about the magnitude of the bias from this.       13
II. FURTHER DETAILS ON HOW WE CONSTRUCTED PRICE VARIABLES 
 
  As explained in the text, we specify the price of charitable giving as:  
 
(A.19)   Pit = 1 -mtrit - nit *sit*a*(d*mtrcgit+1 - mtrcharcgit)    
 
Recall that nit is non-cash donations as a share of total donations, sit is donations of stock and real 
estate as a share of total non-cash donations, a is unrealized appreciation as a share of non-cash 
donations, and d is a discount factor applied to the capital gains tax rate to reflect the fact that the 
alternative to donating an appreciated asset today may be to realize the capital gain on the asset 
at some distant future date or not at all. 
 Constructing  nit is complicated by the fact that various types of charitable contributions 
are subject to percentage of AGI limits, and donations in excess of those limits may be carried 
forward to later years.  In our tax return data, the only charity variables that we have on a 
consistent basis are total charitable deductions after limitations, reported non-cash donations 
(taxpayers sometimes report amounts in excess of the limits for these), and carryovers from prior 
years that are deducted in the current year.  The data do not indicate whether carried over 
amounts were originally cash or non-cash. Given this, we define nit to be the minimum of non-
cash donations currently reported by the taxpayer or 30 percent of AGI (the limit applicable for 
most types of non-cash donations), divided by the current charitable deduction after limitations 
less carryovers from prior years.  As noted in the text, because nit is likely endogenously related 
to charitable donations, we replace it with its mean value in the sample, 0.17, when constructing 
instruments for price. 
  We constructed an income-specific value for sit, donations of stocks and real estate as a 
share of non-cash donations, from Table 3 in the July 2008 version of Ackerman and Auten.  
Taxpayers with incomes below $75,000 (in constant year 2004 dollars) are assigned a value of 
0.028 for sit, and those with incomes above $1 million are assigned a value of 0.956.  Ackerman 
and Auten report mean values of sit of 0.215 for incomes between $75,000 and $100,000, 0.52 
for incomes between $100,000 and $250,000, 0.666 for incomes between $250,000 and 
$500,000, and 0.891 for incomes between $500,000 and $1 million.  For these intermediate 
income ranges, we assign the mean value of s to the midpoint income in each range, and linearly 
interpolate values of sit for others.  The mean imputed value of sit is 0.56.   14
  We computed an average value of 0.59 for a from a sample of taxpayers who were 
subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT) in the years 1987 through 2002, and therefore had 
to report capital gains on donations of appreciated assets.  We limit the sample to those who 
would have been on the AMT even if they did not make any non-cash charitable donations.  For 
these returns, we computed the aggregate amount of capital gains on donations of appreciated 
assets, and divided it by the aggregate value among the returns of the product of non-cash 
contributions and sit (where sit is imputed for each return explained in the previous paragraph). 
There is relatively little evidence available to determine a reasonable value for the 
discount factor d applied to the capital gains rate.  The previous literature has generally ignored 
mtrcharcg and has assumed that the product a*s *d = 0.5. The 0.5 comes from papers by 
Feldstein (1975) and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) that estimated it as a parameter in a cross-
sectional charitable giving equation using maximum likelihood methods.  We attempt to improve 
on this by inferring a reasonable value for d based on recent research by Ivkovic, Poterba, and 
Weisbenner (2005).   Based on five years of individual-level data on asset trades from a 
brokerage house, they estimate the probability of selling an asset at each point over the five year 
period, conditional on the accumulated capital gains.  Using this in conjunction with an assumed 
statutory tax rate on realized capital gains of 28% and an assumed 1% monthly nominal rate of 
appreciation (which is roughly consistent with the experience of the S&P500 1979-2005), they 
estimate an effective present-value- equivalent marginal tax rate on gains of 24% if assets not 
sold in the first 5 years are sold in year 5,  13% if assets not sold in the first 5 years are sold in 
year 20, and 0.6% if assets not sold in the first 5 years are held until death 20 years in the future.  
We compute an effective rate on assets sold at any time over 20 years by linearly interpolating 
between the 24% and 13% rates, assuming probabilities of sale in 5-year periods from year 5 to 
year 20 are proportional to sales of assets with that holding period as a share of total sales of 
assets with holding periods between 5 and 20 years, reported in Auten and Wilson (1999).  We 
then compute the weighted average of that and the 0.6% rate on gains held until death in 20 
years, where the weight on 0.6% is the estimated revenues that would be raised form taxing 
unrealized gains at death in 1998 (estimated by Poterba and Weisbenner, 2003) divided by actual 
revenues raised from taxing capital gains, from <http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/capgain2-2008.pdf>.  The resulting effective rate is 19.5%, implying a discount 
factor of 19.5/28 or approximately 0.7.   15
III. DETAILS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
CURRENT CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
  In our data, we have the amount of prior year contribution that is carried over and 
claimed in the current year for all observations in all years from 1980 on.  The year in which the 
carryover was originally donated is not reported in the data.  Moreover, taxpayers do not report 
directly whether their contributions were limited in a particular year, and the percent of AGI 
limits differ depending on the type of organization to which the taxpayer is contributing and the 
type of gift.     
  In a situation where a taxpayer deducts a carried-over contribution from a prior year, we 
attempt to pinpoint the prior year in which the carried-over contribution originated, and 
reallocate it to that year. To do this, we rely on the following assumptions: (1) donations leading 
to carryovers must have originated in years when the taxpayer was at or above at least one of the 
percentage of AGI limits on charitable deductions; (2) if a taxpayer deducting a carried-over 
prior year donation in year t is also deducting a carried-over prior-year donation in year t-1 then 
the donation likely originated in a year earlier than t-1; and (3) if a taxpayer deducting a carried-
over prior year donation in year t is also is also deducting carried-over prior-year donations in 
both year t-1 and year t-2 then the donation likely originated in a year earlier than t-2.  Drawing 
on these assumptions, we use the following algorithm to attempt to identify the year in which 
carryover contributions originated. For any taxpayer that reports carried over contributions from 
prior years in year t, we look back to year t-1.  If no carryovers were claimed in year t-1, then 
year t-1 is considered a possible source of the carryover.  We then check year t-2.  If year t-1 was 
not a possible source, and no carryovers were claimed in year t-2, then year t-2 is considered a 
possible source of the carryover.  If year t-1 was a possible source, then we include t-2 as also a 
possible source only if no carryover was claimed in year t-2 and the taxpayer was likely to be 
limited under the rules that pertain to “not-50% organizations” (for which the percent of AGI 
limits are lower).  If more than one year is identified as a possible source, we then attempt to 
refine the set of possible source years by including as possible sources only the years that would 
have been limited under limits that apply to “50% organizations” (for which the percent of AGI 
limits are higher).   The vast majority of charitable contributions are to 50% organizations.  
Finally, we allocate the carryover amounts equally among the year or years that are identified as 
possible sources of the carryover.  The re-allocated carryovers are then added to the charitable   16
deduction for the year or years when we deem the original donation to have occurred, and we 
subtract from that total the carryovers that were claimed in that year but came from prior year 
donations.   
  Our tax return data include the amounts that taxpayers originally reported on the 
individual line items from Schedule A for non-cash donations (except for a subset of returns in 
1979 and 1980), and in some years and for some samples we also have the individual line item 
from Schedule A for cash donations.  Taxpayers sometimes report amounts on these line items 
that are clearly in excess of the applicable percentage of AGI limits, and then apply the limits 
only on the line item for the final charitable deduction.  Joulfaian (2001) used information from 
the individual line items for cash and non-cash donations to infer total current year contributions.  
We do not take this approach because we are missing at least one of these individual line items 
for a large number of observations in our data set, and because our review of the relevant IRS 
forms, instructions, and publications suggest to us that the meaning of these line items may be 
inconsistent across years and taxpayers. The instructions for how to apply the percentage of AGI 
limits on charitable giving are contained in IRS Publication 526 (versions of this publication 
dating back to 1992 are available at www.irs.gov).  In many years since 1992, the relevant 
worksheet in that publication specifically instructed taxpayers to report the after-limitation 
amounts of non-cash donations and cash donations on the individual line items for those types of 
donations on Schedule A.  In other years, the worksheet was ambiguous in this regard.  An 
examination of the data suggests that some taxpayers do report amounts above the percentage of 
AGI limits on the individual line items for cash- and non-cash giving, regardless of what the 
instructions say.  But because the instructions often clearly indicated not to do so, it is unclear 
what fraction of people with giving above the limits actually reported it there, and whether this 
varied systematically across years depending on how the instructions were phrased. Moreover, 
the IRS Statistics of Income division edited the cash, non-cash, and carryover line item variables 
in 1987-1990 to make them sum to the allowable charitable deduction (Joulfaian, 2001, p. 356).  
In any event, using this alternative approach would dramatically shrink our sample size and 
remove many years with tax reforms that are useful for identification, because the amount 
reported on the individual line item for cash donations on Schedule A is only available in our 
data for a limited number of years.   17
IV. ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
In the balance of this appendix, we present the additional results from regressions reported in the 
paper, as well as results from a wide range of sensitivity analyses.   
 
A. Pooled cross-section estimates and sensitivity to methods for addressing censoring 
 
  In Table A.2, we report estimates from specifications that omit both fixed effects and lag 
and lead changes in price and income, in order to verify that our data yield estimates roughly 
similar to the old cross-sectional literature when we use similar sources of identification.  
Columns (1) and (2) estimate such a model that also omits the state-level control variables, while 
column (3) adds back the state characteristics. In column (1), the dependent variable is the 
current charitable deduction (excluding current donations over the limits and including 
carryovers from prior years), while in columns (2) and (3) the dependent variable is the current 
charitable deduction in year t, less carryovers from prior years, plus any carryovers claimed in 
the next two future years that various indicators suggest probably came from year t.  To examine 
whether explicitly accounting for censoring of the dependent variable affects the estimated price 
and income elasticities, column (4) presents marginal effects from a Tobit specification that 
includes the state-level control variables and uses donation instead of deduction in constructing 
the dependent variable.  In all of these specifications, the price of giving is instrumented using 
the first dollar price.
3 
                                                      
3 In all of the pooled cross-section specifications in Table A.2, we include two variables that are omitted from the 
fixed effects specifications reported in the text due to their collinearity with the combination of fixed effects and 
year effects: age and marital status.  In addition, in the specifications that include state covariates we include a state-
specific measure of church attendance in 2006.  The church variable is the share of state residents who say they 
“attend church or synagogue once a week or almost every week,” from a Gallup poll cited in San Diego Union-
Tribune (2006).   18
Table A.2 -- Explaining log charitable giving: pooled cross section estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Charitable 
deduction, no state  
covariates 
Charitable 
donation, no state 
covariates 
Charitable 




-0.992 -0.960 -0.957 -1.026  lnPit  (0.152)*** (0.143)*** (0.122)*** (0.030)*** 
0.918 0.893 0.896 0.899  lnYit  (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.003)*** 
0.026 0.044 0.044 0.047  age 
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** 
0.783 -1.130 -1.159 -1.395  (age/100) squared 
(0.309)** (0.361)***  (0.370)***  (0.157)*** 
0.281 0.331 0.324 0.351  married 
(0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.010)*** 
0.137 0.126 0.124 0.128  children 
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.005)*** 
0.114 0.111 0.111 0.114  other dependents 
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** 
   -1.111  -1.170  lnP_salestax 
   (1.037)  (0.265)*** 
   -0.057  -0.057  ln(state house price) 
   (0.076)  (0.014)*** 
   -1.334  -1.403  state unemployment 
   (0.991)  (0.295)*** 
   0.802  0.797  church 
   (0.284)***  (0.068)*** 
   1.942  1.950  state gov't spending 
   (0.877)**  (0.144)*** 
All columns control for year dummies, and use first-dollar price as an instrument for price.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses; in the first three columns they are robust and clustered by state and income class; standard errors for the 
tobit are not robust nor clustered and they are not adjusted for the use of instrumental variables.  Asterisks denote 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels. 
   
  In the most basic specifications in column (1), the price elasticity of the charitable 
deduction is estimated to be -0.992 with a standard error of 0.152, and the income elasticity for 
the charitable deduction is estimated to be 0.918, with a standard error of 0.017.  When we 
switch to using our measure of charitable donation in column (2), the estimates are very similar; 
the price elasticity is -0.960 with a standard error of 0.143, while the income elasticity is 0.893 
with a standard error of 0.017. These price elasticities are somewhat below the standard estimate 
of from single year cross-sectional studies around -1.2 noted in Clotfelter (1985) for estimates of 
this type, and the income elasticities are a bit higher than the standard estimate of around 0.7.  
One possible explanation for the modest differences in estimates compared to traditional single-
year cross section studies is that we are here using a pooled set of cross sections from a large   19
number of years that span widely varying federal and state tax laws, which provides greater 
independent identification for price and income variation and should reduce any biases arising 
from misspecification of functional form and difficulty disentangling price effects from income 
effects.  In Column (3), controlling for state level characteristics has no appreciable effect on 
these estimates. 
  Table A.2 also depicts estimates of the effects of the various control variables.  In the 
cross section, many of these factors have statistically significant and sensible effects.  Age, 
marriage, children, and dependents are each estimated to have a positive partial association with 
charitable giving.  Church attendance in one's state is estimated to have a particularly large 
positive impact on giving.   Higher state government spending has a positive partial association 
with charitable donations, which is the opposite of "crowd out," although the estimates are 
imprecise.  Log real state housing price and state unemployment rate have negative point 
estimates, but the standard errors are too large to say anything conclusive about them when we 
use robust clustered standard errors.   
The degree of censoring in our estimation sample is small; only 3.7 percent of returns in 
the sample have zero charitable donations.  In Column (4) of Table A.2, we report marginal 
effects, calculated at the means of the data in our estimation sample, of a Tobit model estimated 
on the pooled cross-sectional data, which includes the same explanatory variables as in column 
(3).
4  The dependent variable is the same as in columns (2) and (3), ln(charity + 10), and the 
Tobit accounts for censoring at a lower limit of ln(10). 
5 The marginal effects estimated from the 
Tobit regression are quite similar to those in the other specifications, suggesting that explicitly 
accounting for the censoring of charitable giving does not have an appreciable effect on 
estimated price and income elasticities, at least in the pooled cross-section.   
Estimating a censored regression model with over 60,000 fixed effects and instrumental 
variables is extremely challenging because the fixed effects cannot be differenced out of a non-
                                                      
4 To address the endogeneity of price in the Tobit specification, we estimate a first stage linear regression where 
price is the dependent variable, and first-dollar price and the exogenous covariates are the explanatory variables.  
We then include the residual from the linear first stage equation for price as a control variable in the Tobit 
specification.  Smith and Blundell (1986) show the conditions under which this will produce a consistent estimator 
of the Tobit coefficients.  The reported standard errors in the Tobit have not been corrected for the use of 
instrumental variables. 
   
5 As long as the dependent variable is measured in log form, using a Tobit model does not obviate the need to add a 
constant to charity, since the log of charity is still undefined when charity equals zero.  We explore the sensitivity to 
the size of the constant added to charity further below.   20
linear model, and including them directly in the specification was not feasible given the 
technology we had to work with at the Treasury Department.  Fack and Landais (2009) estimate 
a censored quantile regression using pooled cross-sectional data to investigate the effects of tax 
incentives on charitable giving in France, which has the advantage of dealing with censoring in a 
way that requires fewer restrictive parametric assumptions than a Tobit does, of allowing the 
marginal effects of tax incentives on charitable donations to vary across quantiles of the 
distribution of donations in a flexible fashion, and avoiding distortion due to outliers. But 
implementing that approach was much easier in their context because they did not attempt to 
control for individual-specific fixed effects nor use instrumental variables.  Chernozhukov, 
Fernandez-Val, and Kowalski, Amanda (2008) recently developed a censored quantile 
instrumental variables estimator, but implementing this with over 60,000 fixed effects was not 
feasible given our technology.  Honore (1992) has developed a censored least absolute 
devaiations regression model that controls for fixed effects through a differencing-like method, 
but this does not allow for instrumental variables.  Application of these methods to estimate the 
price elasticity of charitable giving would be a promising extension, but given the centrality of 
fixed effects and instrumental variables to our identification strategy, the technological 
limitations of the computers and software we have to work with at Treasury, and the very small 
degree of censoring in our data, we leave this for future research. 
 
B. Fixed effects estimates omitting future price and income changes 
 
In Table A.3, we demonstrate the impact of adding individual-specific fixed effects to the 
specification, while omitting lagged and / or future changes in price and income.  In column (1) 
of Table A.3, we estimate a regression to the pooled cross section specification in column (3) of 
Table A.2, but adding individual specific fixed effects; it is also similar to the specification 
shown in column (5) of Table 2 in the text, but without lagged or future changes in price and 
income.  Compared to the cross-sectional specification from column (3) of Table A.2, the price 
elasticity is now smaller in absolute value, dropping from -0.96 to -0.63, and the income 
elasticity is much smaller, dropping from 0.90 to 0.38.  .  The low income elasticity is what we 
would expect if people respond more to persistent variation in income than to transitory 
fluctuations in income, as the income elasticity in this specification is measuring responses to a   21
mix of transitory and persistent changes in income.  The price elasticity is actually very similar 
to persistent price elasticity of -0.61 we estimate in column (5) in Table 2 in the text, but column 
(2) of Table A.3 demonstrates that this similarity results from two biases working in opposite 
directions, which will not necessarily always offset each other so closely.  In column (2) we add 
two lagged changes in price and income but still omit future changes.  Here the coefficients on 
lnPt and lnYt represent “persistent” price and income elasticities in the sense that they estimate 
the change in giving in response to a change in price or income that has persisted for three years, 
but they ignore the possibility of anticipated future changes in price and income.  In this 
specification, the persistent price elasticity increases somewhat to -0.768, and the persistent 
income elasticity decreases to 0.506, suggesting that failing to incorporate the possibility of 
anticipated future price and income changes tends to bias the persistent price elasticity upwards 
in absolute value, and tends to bias the persistent income elasticity downwards, but by modest 
amounts in this particular specification. 
In column (3) of Table A.3, we show the effects of omitting lagged and lead changes in 
price and income from the specification shown in column (5) of Table 3 in the text, where 
coefficients on all variables except price are allowed to differ across income classes.  In this 
specification, bias to the persistent price elasticity from omitting lagged and lead changes is more 
apparent, as omitting them reduces the persistent price elasticity estimate from -1.10 to -0.76.  
The difference here may be due to the fact that including separate year dummies by income class 
absorbs most of the effects of large and obvious predictable future tax price (as evidenced by the 
small coefficient on future price change in column (5) of Table 3), but not the effects of lagged 
changes in price (which as we will show below in Table A.5 still have a large and statistically 
significant effect on current giving even when we control for different time effects by income 
class).  Income elasticity estimates in column (3) of Table A.3 are once again substantially 
smaller than the persistent income elasticity estimates we find when we add lagged and lead 
changes in income and price in column (5) of Table 3. 
   22
Table A.3 -- Fixed effects estimates omitting future changes in price and income from the 
specification 
(1)  (2) (3) 
Assuming all coefficients 
are constant across income 
classes 
Allowing coefficients 
on all variables 
except price to differ 
across income classes 
 
No lags or 
leads 
Two lags, 
no leads  No lags or leads 
 0.031   
ΔlnPit-1  
 (0.040)   
 0.202   
ΔlnPit   (0.064)***   
-0.629 -0.768  -0.756  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity] (0.058)***  (0.087)***  (0.092)** 
 -0.061   
ΔlnYit-1   (0.008)***   
 -0.158   
ΔlnYit   (0.008)***   
0.337  < $100K 
(0.035)** 
0.340  $100K - 
$200K  (0.034)** 
0.255  $200K - 
$500K  (0.033)** 
0.284  $500K - 
$1M  (0.031)** 
0.445 








All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending.  In column (3) all variables 
except price and individual fixed effects are interacted with income class dummies.  Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (***) levels. 
 
 
C. More detail on coefficient estimates for specifications reported in the paper, and tests of 
equality of coefficients across income classes 
 
In Table A.4, we report the full results from the specifications reported in Table 2 in the 
text, including coefficients on demographic and state level variables.  Briefly, number of children 
and number of other dependents are both estimated to have positive and significant effects on 
giving, and age squared has significant negative effects in all specifications. Estimates for state-
year-specific variables generally have confidence intervals too wide to say anything conclusive.    23
We tried omitting these variables from the specification as well and found that the coefficients 
on the price and income variables were virtually unchanged.  
 
Table A.4 -- Coefficients on All Variables from Specifications in Table 2, Explaining Log 
Charitable Giving: Estimates Assuming Coefficients are Uniform across Income Classes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Separate federal and state prices 
 
Predictable  










0.027 0.170 0.022 0.163 0.012 0.021 
ΔlnPit-1  
(0.046) (0.075)** (0.042) (0.074)** (0.047) (0.040) 
0.181 0.567 0.171 0.564 0.189 0.198 
ΔlnPit 
(0.067)*** (0.120)*** (0.063)*** (0.125)*** (0.066)*** (0.064)*** 
-0.346 -1.164 -0.389 -1.131 -0.607 -0.651  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.164)** (0.278)***  (0.140)***  (0.202)***  (0.179)*** (0.097)*** 
0.442 0.250 0.371 0.292 0.180 0.145 
ΔlnPi,t+1 
(0.185)** (0.377) (0.158)** (0.302)  (0.198) (0.046)*** 
-0.054 -0.054  -0.061 -0.061 
ΔlnYit-1 
(0.008)*** (0.008)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
-0.141 -0.141  -0.153 -0.156 
ΔlnYit 
(0.010)*** (0.009)***  (0.008)*** (0.007)*** 
0.510 0.528  0.602 0.541  lnYit  [persistent 
income elasticity]  (0.107)*** (0.020)***  (0.120)*** (0.018)*** 
0.034 0.057  0.132 0.049 
ΔlnYi,t+1  (0.141) (0.013)***  (0.158) (0.008)*** 
-0.456 -0.453  -0.413 -0.392 
lnP_salestax 
(0.509) (0.509)  (0.501) (0.523) 
-4.834 -4.706  -3.847 -4.174 
(age/100) squared 
(0.968)*** (0.557)***  (1.041)*** (0.547)*** 
0.037 0.037  0.034 0.035 
children 
(0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
0.040 0.040  0.038 0.039 
other dependents 
(0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
0.028 0.026  0.022 0.029  ln(state house 
price)  (0.041) (0.036)  (0.042) (0.037) 
0.106 0.115  0.064 -0.005  state 
unemployment  (0.424) (0.398)  (0.427) (0.409) 
-0.102 -0.083  0.229 0.185  state gov't 
spending  (0.507) (0.502)  (0.530) (0.517) 
All columns control for individual fixed effects and year dummies, (not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by 
state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) 
levels. 
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  In Table A.5, we report coefficients on all price and income variables in the 
specifications reported in the paper.  Relative to what was already discussed in the paper, one 
notable point is that the coefficient on ΔlnPit is consistently large and statistically significant.  
While the coefficient on lagged changes in state price remain larger than those on lagged 
changes in federal price, compared to Table 2 the coefficient on lagged federal price changes 
gets larger and moves close to the coefficient on lagged state price change, which makes sense 
given that controlling for separate time dummies by income class is removing most of the large, 
obvious time-series variation in federal price from the variation used to identify federal price 
effects, leaving more subtle identifying variation that may take longer to learn about and 
understand.  Table A.5 also demonstrates that coefficients on ΔlnYit are large, negative, and 
statistically significant for most income classes.  As noted in the text, this is consistent with 
mean-reversion in income, along with stronger responsiveness of charitable giving to persistent 
than to transitory variation income.  Coefficients on ΔlnYit tend to grow larger in absolute value 
at higher income levels, suggesting that mean reversion in income may be stronger at higher 
income levels. 
 
Table A.5 -- Coefficients on All Price Variables from Specifications in Table 3, Allowing 
Coefficients on Non-Price Variables to Differ Across Income Classes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Separate federal and state prices 
 
Predictable  










0.120 0.121 0.119 0.122 0.116 0.113 
ΔlnPit-1  
(0.052)** (0.074) (0.047)** (0.076) (0.050)**  (0.046)** 
0.316 0.473 0.315 0.490 0.336 0.337 
ΔlnPit 
(0.075)*** (0.118)*** (0.071)*** (0.130)*** (0.074)*** (0.072)*** 
-0.919 -1.530 -0.857 -1.396 -1.103 -0.958  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.435)* (0.582)***  (0.132)***  (0.198)*** (0.453)** (0.139)*** 
0.120 -0.273 0.141 -0.104 -0.044 0.086 
ΔlnPi,t+1 
(0.445) (0.664)  (0.058)*  (0.066) (0.464) (0.054) 
All columns control for lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels. 
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Table A.5, Continued -- Coefficients on Income Variables from Specifications in Table 3, 
Estimates Allowing Coefficients on Non-Price Variables to Differ Across Income Classes 
(1) and (2)  (3) and (4)  (5)  (6) 
Separate federal and state prices  Combined federal and state price 
  Predictable  
tax change 
instruments Perfect  foresight 
Predictable tax 
change 
instruments Perfect  foresight 
-0.008 -0.034 -0.011 -0.037 
< $100K 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021) 
-0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.028  $100K - 
$200K  (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020) 
-0.071 -0.062 -0.075 -0.064  $200K - 
$500K  (0.022)*** (0.013)*** (0.022)*** (0.013)*** 
-0.092 -0.059 -0.093 -0.061  $500K - 
$1M  (0.022)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)*** (0.013)*** 
-0.059 -0.063 -0.061 -0.064 
ΔlnYit-1 
≥ $1M 
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
-0.071 -0.096 -0.074 -0.098 
< $100K 
(0.045) (0.030)***  (0.044)*  (0.030)*** 
-0.059 -0.057 -0.062 -0.061  $100K - 
$200K  (0.042) (0.024)** (0.042)  (0.024)*** 
-0.157 -0.141 -0.163 -0.146  $200K - 
$500K  (0.029)*** (0.019)*** (0.029)*** (0.018)*** 
-0.200 -0.153 -0.206 -0.160  $500K - 
$1M  (0.032)*** (0.018)*** (0.033)*** (0.017)*** 
-0.164 -0.166 -0.170 -0.172 
ΔlnYit 
≥ $1M 
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** 
0.601 0.438 0.612 0.437 
< $100K 
(0.211)*** (0.044)*** (0.211)*** (0.044)*** 
0.458 0.416 0.467 0.417  $100K - 
$200K  (0.150)*** (0.040)*** (0.150)*** (0.039)*** 
0.315 0.376 0.330 0.386  $200K - 
$500K  (0.109)*** (0.040)*** (0.109)*** (0.039)*** 
0.298 0.420 0.323 0.438  $500K - 
$1M  (0.107)*** (0.037)*** (0.109)*** (0.036)*** 
0.557 0.621 0.580 0.641 
lnYit   
≥ $1M 
(0.140)*** (0.026)*** (0.144)*** (0.024)*** 
0.314 0.024 0.330 0.023 
< $100K 
(0.337) (0.023) (0.337) (0.022) 
0.112 0.051 0.133 0.053  $100K - 
$200K  (0.304) (0.018)*** (0.302) (0.018)*** 
-0.085 0.045 -0.076 0.050  $200K - 
$500K  (0.209) (0.015)*** (0.212) (0.015)*** 
-0.354 0.007 -0.339 0.015  $500K - 
$1M  (0.208)*  (0.013) (0.207) (0.013) 
-0.014 0.055 -0.001 0.064 
ΔlnYi,t+1 
≥ $1M 
(0.172) (0.016)*** (0.178) (0.016)*** 
All columns control for lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels.   26
Table A.6 shows a full set of estimated coefficients on all variables, including year 
dummies, for the specification shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 in the text (the 
specification using predictable tax change instruments that allows all coefficients on all variables 
except for price to differ by income class, and which includes separate federal and state prices).  
Notably, life cycle factors – represented here by (Age / 100) squared -- and year dummies tend to 
have statistically significant effects that appear to differ substantially across income classes.  
Children and other dependents both have positive and statistically significant effects across all 
income classes, and state housing prices are positively and statistically significantly associated 
with charitable giving for the below $100,000 income group, with smaller and less conclusive 
effects for higher-income groups, consistent with the fact that housing represents a larger share 
of wealth for the lower income groups (recalling that this is a sample of people who are in the 
midst of a span of itemizing deductions for at least six consecutive years, and so even those with 
incomes below $100,000 are likely to be homeowners).  Aside from that, effects of other control 
variables are inconclusive due to large standard errors. 
  In Table A.7, for each specification reported in Table 3 in the text, we report p-values 
from chi-square tests against the null hypothesis that coefficients on each explanatory variable 
are equal across income classes.  Across all specifications, we are able to reject the hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients across income classes at the 1 percent significance level for the persistent 
income elasticity, (age/100) squared, and all of the year dummies (with the exception of 1983 in 
the predictable tax change instrument specifications, where p-values are just slightly above 0.01).  
Equality across income classes for the coefficient on ΔlnYit can be rejected at the 1 percent 
significance level in perfect foresight specifications, and at the 5 percent significance level in the 
predictable tax change specifications.   We can also reject equality of coefficients across incomes 
at the 5 percent significance level for ln(state house price) in the perfect foresight specifications.   
In the perfect foresight specifications we can reject equality across income levels for the 
coefficients on future income change at the 10 percent significance level.  We are not able to 
reject equality of coefficients across income classes at conventional significance levels for the 
other control variables. 
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Table A.6 – Estimated Coefficients on Control Variables, Specification in First Two Columns of 
Table 3, with Predictable Tax Change Instruments, Separate Federal and State Prices, and 
Allowing Coefficients on Non-Price Variables to Differ Across Income Classes 






$1 million  > $1 million 
-0.023 -0.155 0.270 -0.444 -0.862  lnP_salestax 
(0.596) (0.792) (0.674) (0.771) (0.540) 
-5.525 -5.947 -6.134 -6.250 -5.910  (age/100) squared 
(1.143)*** (1.088)*** (1.067)*** (1.047)*** (1.000)*** 
0.017 0.030 0.039 0.040 0.056  children 
(0.012)  (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** 
0.027 0.031 0.038 0.043 0.057  other dependents 
(0.012)** (0.011)***  (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
0.101 0.062 0.020 0.019 -0.036  ln(state house 
price)  (0.048)**  (0.052) (0.045) (0.053) (0.047) 
0.982 0.139 0.116 0.670 -1.324  state 
unemployment  (0.717) (0.614) (0.666) (0.766) (1.063) 
-0.539 -0.379 -0.791 -0.233 0.531  state gov't 
spending  (0.514) (0.466) (0.536) (0.608) (0.743) 
-3.560 -1.463 0.876 0.985 -2.169 
1981 dummy 
(1.094)*** (0.184)***  (1.142) (1.918) (2.653) 
-3.556 -1.499 0.676 0.617 -2.277 
1982 dummy 
(1.102)*** (0.172)***  (1.147) (1.927) (2.664) 
-3.389 -1.375 0.627 0.728 -2.073 
1983 dummy 
(1.099)*** (0.163)***  (1.151) (1.919) (2.660) 
-3.307 -1.139 1.108 1.228 -1.885 
1984 dummy 
(1.105)*** (0.153)***  (1.151) (1.925) (2.680) 
-3.238 -1.067 1.223 1.430 -1.749 
1985 dummy 
(1.119)*** (0.135)***  (1.140) (1.902) (2.690) 
-3.099 -0.941 1.324 1.440 -1.491 
1986 dummy 
(1.113)*** (0.138)***  (1.144) (1.902) (2.645) 
-2.981 -0.937 1.371 1.502 -1.649 
1987 dummy 
(1.115)*** (0.121)***  (1.140) (1.911) (2.698) 
-2.942 -0.766 1.556 1.699 -1.434 
1988 dummy 
(1.116)*** (0.122)***  (1.141) (1.906) (2.678) 
-2.864 -0.675 1.678 1.865 -1.225 
1989 dummy 
(1.112)** (0.108)***  (1.141) (1.899) (2.669) 
-2.790 -0.596 1.778 1.909 -1192 
1990 dummy 
(1.112)** (0.106)***  (1.148) (1.900) (2.659) 
-2.700 -0.497 1.881 2.002 -1.021 
1991 dummy 
(1.120)** (0.093)***  (1.143)* (1.904)  (2.667) 
-2.582 -0.393 1.925 2.007 -1.041 
1992 dummy 
(1.123)** (0.083)***  (1.145)* (1.908)  (2.656) 
-2.529 -0.300 2.015 2.091 -0.797 
1993 dummy 
(1.123)** (0.046)***  (1.142)* (1.901)  (2.643) 
-2.506 -0.284 2.071 2.157 -0.689 
1994 dummy 
(1.131)** (0.057)***  (1.140)* (1.903)  (2.651) 
All columns control for individual fixed effects.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels.   28
 
Table A.6, Continued – Estimated Coefficients on Control Variables, Specification in First Two 
Columns of Table 3, with Predictable Tax Change Instruments, Separate Federal and State 
Prices, and Allowing Coefficients on Non-Price Variables to Differ Across Income Classes 






$1 million  > $1 million 
-2.402 -0.230 2.138 2.463 -0.850 
1995 dummy 
(1.130)** (0.046)***  (1.133)* (1.891)  (2.650) 
-2.336 -0.122 2.301 2.550 -0.500 
1996 dummy 
(1.134)** (0.032)*** (1.130)** (1.894)  (2.642) 
-2.195 omitted 2.425 2.665 -0.340 
1997 dummy 
(1.143)* category  (1.123)** (1.878)  (2.690) 
-2.074 0.101 2.397 2.443 -0.339 
1998 dummy 
(1.145)* (0.036)***  (1.130)** (1.887)  (2.620) 
-1.995 0.214 2.637 2.663 -0.075 
1999 dummy 
(1.149)* (0.039)***  (1.121)** (1.873)  (2.650) 
-1.873 0.312 2.664 2.734 -0.134 
2000 dummy 
(1.151) (0.044)***  (1.127)** (1.867)  (2.617) 
-1.747 0.435 2.795 2.908 -0.080 
2001 dummy 
(1.154) (0.047)***  (1.125)** (1.878)  (2.654) 
-1.653 0.523 2.929 3.042 0.033 
2002 dummy 
(1.162) (0.059)***  (1.126)*** (1.898)  (2.678) 
-1.563 0.608 3.022 3.231 0.255 
2003 dummy 
(1.170) (0.074)***  (1.128)*** (1.917)*  (2.705) 
-1.465 0.756 3.158 3.406 0.439 
2004 dummy 
(1.176) (0.080)***  (1.128)*** (1.917)*  (2.716) 
All columns control for individual fixed effects.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels. 
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Table A.7 -- P-values on Tests against Null Hypothesis that Coefficients are Equal across 
Income Classes, for Specifications in Table 3, Allowing Coefficients on Non-Price Variables to 
Differ Across Income Classes 
  (1) and (2)  (3) and (4)  (5)  (6) 




instruments  Perfect foresight 
Predictable tax 
change instruments  Perfect foresight 
0.1606 0.3788 0.1527 0.4074 
ΔlnYit-1 
    
0.0498 0.0001 0.0386 0.0001 
ΔlnYit 
    
0.0059 0.0000 0.0047 0.0000  lnYit  [persistent 
income elasticity]      
0.2435 0.0892 0.2219 0.0967 
ΔlnYi,t+1      
0.6770 0.5393 0.6585 0.5240 
lnP_salestax 
    
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(age/100) squared 
    
0.2306 0.3167 0.2522 0.3411 
children 
    
0.4644 0.4063 0.5288 0.4759 
other dependents 
    
0.0912 0.0225 0.1207 0.0349  ln(state house 
price)      
0.3285 0.3208 0.3177 0.3261  state 
unemployment      
0.3585 0.3010 0.3424 0.2778  state gov't 
spending      
0.0029 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 
1981 dummy 
    
0.0073 0.0001 0.0090 0.0001 
1982 dummy 
    
0.0144 0.0007 0.0173 0.0004 
1983 dummy 
    
0.0041 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000 
1984 dummy 
    
0.0038 0.0001 0.0048 0.0000 
1985 dummy 
    
0.0050 0.0001 0.0060 0.0001 
1986 dummy 
    
0.0049 0.0001 0.0058 0.0001 
1987 dummy 
    
0.0034 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 
1988 dummy 
    
0.0030 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 
1989 dummy 
    
All columns control for individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels.   30
Table A.7, Continued -- P-values on Tests against Null Hypothesis that Coefficients are Equal 
across Income Classes, for Specifications in Table 3, Allowing Coefficients on All Variables 
Including Price to Differ Across Income Classes 
  (1) and (2)  (3) and (4)  (5)  (6) 




instruments  Perfect foresight 
Predictable tax 
change instruments  Perfect foresight 
0.0024 0.0000 0.0029 0.0000 
1990 dummy 
    
0.0033 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000 
1991 dummy 
    
0.0033 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 
1992 dummy 
    
0.0048 0.0001 0.0058 0.0001 
1993 dummy 
    
0.0051 0.0001 0.0062 0.0001 
1994 dummy 
    
0.0011 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 
1995 dummy 
    
0.0020 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 
1996 dummy 
    
0.0023 0.0001 0.0029 0.0001 
1997 dummy 
    
0.0068 0.0006 0.0079 0.0006 
1998 dummy 
    
0.0080 0.0005 0.0092 0.0005 
1999 dummy 
    
0.0046 0.0001 0.0055 0.0001 
2000 dummy 
    
0.0036 0.0001 0.0044 0.0001 
2001 dummy 
    
0.0040 0.0001 0.0047 0.0001 
2002 dummy 
    
0.0045 0.0001 0.0053 0.0001 
2003 dummy 
    
0.0044 0.0002 0.0053 0.0002 
2004 dummy 
    
All columns control for individual fixed effects.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels. 
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Tables A.8 and A.9 depict coefficients on all price and income variables for the 
specifications reported in Table 4 in the text, which allow coefficients on all variables including 
price to differ by income class.  Coefficients on lagged price changes again provide evidence of 
gradual adjustment to price changes, perhaps due to learning.  Persistent income elasticities 
exhibit similar patterns across income classes to those in corresponding specifications that 
constrain price elasticities to be constant across income classes.  There is once again evidence of 
a modest positive response to future increases in income in the perfect foresight specifications, 
but evidence on this is inconclusive in the predictable tax change instrument specifications.   
In Table A.10, for each specification reported in Table 4 in the text, we report p-values 
from chi-square tests against the null hypothesis that coefficients on each explanatory variable 
are equal across income classes.  As noted in the text, we generally cannot reject the hypothesis 
of equality of persistent price elasticities across income classes, except that the difference across 
incomes of the persistent state price elasticity is marginally significant in the predictable tax 
change instrument specification, with a p-value of 0.067.  Neither can we reject equality of 
coefficients across income classes for the other price variables at conventional significance 
levels, with on small exception being the coefficient on future state price change in the perfect 
foresight specification.  We can once again consistently reject equality of coefficients across 
income classes for the persistent income elasticity, year dummies, and (age / 100) squared.  
Equality of coefficients across incomes can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level for 
ΔlnYit and ln(state house price) in the perfect foresight specifications, and for ΔlnYit+1 in the 
perfect foresight specification which includes separate state and federal prices.  Otherwise, we 
generally cannot reject equality of coefficients across income levels for other explanatory 
variables.   32
Table A.8 – Estimated Coefficients on Price Variables from Specifications in Table 4, Allowing 
Coefficients on All Variables Including Price to Differ Across Income Classes 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Separate federal and state prices 
Combined federal  
and state price    
Predictable  
tax change instruments Perfect  foresight 






0.181 -0.019 0.062 -0.181 0.167 0.025  < $100K 
(0.177) (0.184) (0.077) (0.135) (0.156) (0.075) 
0.277 0.193 0.133 0.101 0.256 0.122  $100K - 
$200K  (0.153)* (0.172) (0.076)* (0.136) (0.132)* (0.075) 
0.057 0.220 0.139 0.292 0.080 0.154  $200K - 
$500K  (0.099)  (0.155) (0.084)*  (0.139)**  (0.093) (0.084)* 
0.129 0.149 0.155 0.145 0.134 0.154  $500K - 
$1M  (0.099) (0.151)  (0.094)*  (0.140) (0.094)  (0.090)* 
0.081 0.109 0.109 0.144 0.068 0.098 
ΔlnPit-1 
≥ $1M 
(0.069) (0.102)  (0.064)*  (0.100) (0.065)  (0.060)* 
0.510 0.392 0.260 -0.030 0.512 0.217  < $100K 
(0.325)  (0.338) (0.145)* (0.194) (0.285)* (0.136) 
0.538 0.544 0.293 0.454 0.514 0.301  $100K - 
$200K  (0.227)** (0.307)* (0.141)** (0.233)* (0.205)**  (0.146)** 
0.239 0.307 0.416 0.486 0.257 0.425  $200K - 
$500K  (0.129)* (0.175)*  (0.105)***  (0.129)*** (0.116)** (0.100)*** 
0.193 0.268 0.267 0.320 0.207 0.280  $500K - 
$1M  (0.141) (0.212)  (0.117)**  (0.160)**  (0.142)  (0.116)* 
0.255 0.589 0.291 0.659 0.296 0.347 
ΔlnPit 
≥ $1M 
(0.115)**  (0.163)*** (0.097)*** (0.167)*** (0.104)*** (0.096)*** 
-0.227 0.356 -0.911 -0.858 0.024 -0.869  < $100K 
(0.773) (0.766)  (0.182)***  (0.231)*** (0.667) (0.168)*** 
0.302 -0.362 -0.779 -1.044 0.002 -0.819  $100K - 
$200K  (0.673) (0.662)  (0.150)***  (0.232)*** (0.594) (0.149)*** 
-0.797 -1.185 -0.833 -1.247 -0.913 -0.902  $200K - 
$500K  (0.530) (0.488)**  (0.127)***  (0.180)*** (0.454)** (0.129)*** 
-0.705 -1.036 -0.792 -1.208 -0.833 -0.859  $500K - 
$1M  (0.648) (0.690)  (0.163)***  (0.182)*** (0.626) (0.161)*** 
-1.091 -1.711 -0.831 -1.583 -1.403 -1.032 
lnPit   
≥ $1M 
(0.441)**  (0.626)*** (0.248)*** (0.264)*** (0.432)*** (0.240)*** 
1.463 2.377 0.065 -0.016 1.790 0.070  < $100K 
(1.257) (1.346)* (0.092)  (0.151) (1.067)* (0.085) 
2.021 0.656 0.046 -0.121 1.586 0.015  $100K - 
$200K  (1.213)*  (1.443) (0.099) (0.156) (1.052) (0.098) 
-0.133 -0.630 0.022 -0.308 -0.249 -0.034  $200K - 
$500K  (0.764) (0.751) (0.092)  (0.118)***  (0.619) (0.089) 
0.255 -0.164 0.067 -0.402 0.109 -0.005  $500K - 
$1M  (0.847) (1.029) (0.114)  (0.139)***  (0.811) (0.111) 
-0.029 -0.007 0.321 0.130 -0.248 0.241 
ΔlnPi,t+1 
≥ $1M 
(0.504) (0.733)  (0.135)**  (0.124) (0.434)  (0.125)* 
See notes to Table 4.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels.   33
 
Table A.9 – Estimated Coefficients on All Income Variables from Specifications in Table 4, 
Allowing Coefficients on All Variables Including Price to Differ Across Income Classes 
(1) and (2)  (3) and (4)  (5)  (6) 
Separate federal and state prices  Combined federal and state price 
  Predictable  
tax change 
instruments  Perfect foresight 
Predictable tax 
change 
instruments  Perfect foresight 
0.017 -0.052 0.015 -0.053  < $100K 
(0.064) (0.024) (0.058) (0.024)** 
-0.017 -0.023 -0.016 -0.027  $100K - 
$200K  (0.060) (0.021) (0.052) (0.021) 
-0.075 -0.056 -0.079 -0.062  $200K - 
$500K  (0.025) (0.013)  (0.023)*** (0.013)*** 
-0.099 -0.057 -0.091 -0.060  $500K - 
$1M  (0.023) (0.014)  (0.023)*** (0.013)*** 
-0.058 -0.063 -0.060 -0.064 
ΔlnYit-1 
≥ $1M 
(0.012) (0.010)  (0.011)*** (0.010)*** 
-0.022 -0.122 -0.020 -0.122  < $100K 
(0.103) (0.036)*** (0.093) (0.036)*** 
-0.043 -0.061 -0.046 -0.068  $100K - 
$200K  (0.086) (0.031)** (0.074) (0.030)** 
-0.172 -0.136 -0.173 -0.141  $200K - 
$500K  (0.031)*** (0.019)*** (0.030)*** (0.019)*** 
-0.207 -0.155 -0.212 -0.160  $500K - 
$1M  (0.036)*** (0.017)*** (0.035)*** (0.017)*** 
-0.159 -0.162 -0.171 -0.172 
ΔlnYit 
≥ $1M 
(0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.009)*** 
0.791 0.446 0.823 0.455  < $100K 
(0.425)* (0.048)***  (0.350)**  (0.048)*** 
0.563 0.423 0.577 0.430  $100K - 
$200K  (0.304)* (0.046)***  (0.243)**  (0.045)*** 
0.284 0.374 0.311 0.387  $200K - 
$500K  (0.172)* (0.041)***  (0.141)**  (0.039)*** 
0.216 0.402 0.253 0.428  $500K - 
$1M  (0.097)**  (0.034)*** (0.094)*** (0.033)*** 
0.465 0.620 0.487 0.644 
lnYit   
≥ $1M 
(0.144)*** (0.026)*** (0.138)*** (0.025)*** 
0.678 0.016 0.704 0.019  < $100K 
(0.701) (0.025) (0.590) (0.025) 
0.191 0.038 0.229 0.041  $100K - 
$200K  (0.648) (0.023)* (0.524) (0.022)* 
-0.218 0.035 -0.170 0.042  $200K - 
$500K  (0.288) (0.017)* (0.241)  (0.016)** 
-0.443 -0.004 -0.407 0.012  $500K - 
$1M  (0.224)** (0.013)  (0.219)*  (0.013) 
-0.128 0.057 -0.128 0.063 
ΔlnYi,t+1 
≥ $1M 
(0.186) (0.016)*** (0.175) (0.016)*** 
See notes to Table 4.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (***) levels.  34
Table A.10 -- P-values on Tests against Null Hypothesis that Coefficients are Equal across 
Income Classes, for Specifications in Table 4, Allowing Coefficients on All Variables Including 
Price to Differ Across Income Classes 
  (1) and (2)  (3) and (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Separate federal and state prices  Combined federal-state price 
 
Predictable  
tax change instruments  Perfect foresight 






0.6964 0.8295 0.9293 0.1523  0.7018 0.7543 
ΔlnPit-1 
       
0.7136 0.6305 0.7642 0.0838  0.7112 0.7096 
ΔlnPit 
       
0.1486 0.0668 0.9457 0.2685  0.1430 0.9196  lnPit  [persistent 
price elasticity]         
0.3327 0.3286 0.4245 0.0116  0.3190 0.4212 
ΔlnPi,t+1         
0.4039 0.5452  0.3137 0.6068 
ΔlnYit-1 
     
0.2377 0.0217  0.2245 0.0132 
ΔlnYit 
     
0.0016 0.0000  0.0021 0.0000  lnYit  [persistent 
income elasticity]       
0.1684 0.0362  0.1871 0.1381 
ΔlnYi,t+1       
0.5462 0.4402  0.6063 0.4827 
lnP_salestax 
     
0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
(age/100) squared 
     
0.1207 0.3088  0.1027 0.3138 
children 
     
0.2981 0.3379  0.2634 0.4276 
other dependents 
     
0.1390 0.0167  0.0993 0.0371  ln(state house 
price)       
0.2749 0.4160  0.1557 0.3506  state 
unemployment       
0.3729 0.4732  0.4150 0.3189  state gov't 
spending       
0.0106 0.0002  0.0083 0.0000 
1981 dummy 
     
0.0172 0.0010  0.0139 0.0001 
1982 dummy 
     
0.0318 0.0043  0.0282 0.0007 
1983 dummy 
     
0.0127 0.0005  0.0107 0.0001 
1984 dummy 
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Table A.10, Continued -- P-values on Tests against Null Hypothesis that Coefficients are Equal 
across Income Classes, for Specifications in Table 4, Allowing Coefficients on All Variables 
Including Price to Differ Across Income Classes 
  (1) and (2)  (3) and (4)  (5)  (6) 




instruments  Perfect foresight 
Predictable tax 
change instruments  Perfect foresight 
0.0127 0.0005 0.0109 0.0001 
1985 dummy 
    
0.0157 0.0007 0.0123 0.0001 
1986 dummy 
    
0.0159 0.0006 0.0130 0.0001 
1987 dummy 
    
0.0133 0.0003 0.0113 0.0001 
1988 dummy 
    
0.0118 0.0003 0.0102 0.0001 
1989 dummy 
    
0.0108 0.0002 0.0083 0.0001 
1990 dummy 
    
0.0126 0.0003 0.0104 0.0001 
1991 dummy 
    
0.0111 0.0003 0.0096 0.0001 
1992 dummy 
    
0.0136 0.0006 0.0120 0.0002 
1993 dummy 
    
0.0142 0.0005 0.0125 0.0002 
1994 dummy 
    
0.0057 0.0001 0.0050 0.0000 
1995 dummy 
    
0.0078 0.0001 0.0069 0.0001 
1996 dummy 
    
0.0073 0.0003 0.0109 0.0001 
1997 dummy 
    
0.0198 0.0015 0.0171 0.0009 
1998 dummy 
    
0.0155 0.0013 0.0138 0.0007 
1999 dummy 
    
0.0130 0.0005 0.0118 0.0007 
2000 dummy 
    
0.0108 0.0004 0.0094 0.0001 
2001 dummy 
    
0.0111 0.0004 0.0096 0.0001 
2002 dummy 
    
0.0131 0.0005 0.0116 0.0002 
2003 dummy 
    
0.0146 0.0006 0.0130 0.0003 
2004 dummy 
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D. Sensitivity of estimates to constraining coefficients on certain variables to be constant 
across income classes 
 
  Given that there are some variables for which we cannot reject equality of coefficients 
across income classes, in Table A.11 we report estimates from more parsimonious versions of 
selected specifications that were reported in the text.  Column (1) of Table A.11 shows the price 
and income elasticity estimates that were reported in column (5) of Table 3, the specification that 
allowed coefficients on all non-price variables to differ across income classes, used combined 
federal-state price, and followed the predictable tax change instrument approach.  In column (2) 
of Table A.11, we show estimates from a similar specification which constrains the coefficients 
on lnP_salestax, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment, and state 
gov't spending to be constant across income classes, since we were unable to reject equality of 
coefficients across income classes at the 5 percent significance level for any of these variables in 
this particular specification.  Estimates of the main parameters and standard errors of interest are 
almost identical when we do this – for instance, the estimated persistent price elasticity is -1.11 
with a standard error of 0.44 in the more parsimonious specification, and -1.10 with a standard 
error of 0.45 in the less parsimonious specification, and persistent income elasticity estimates 
and standard errors are also very close across the two specifications.  Columns (3) and (4) of 
Table A.11 repeat this exercise for the specification shown in column (5) of Table 4 in the text, 
which allowed coefficients on all variables including price to differ by income class, used the 
predictable tax change instrument approach, and used combined federal-state prices.  Once again 
the estimates of the key parameters and standard errors of interest are very similar in the more 
and less parsimonious specifications. 
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Table A.11 – Sensitivity of persistent price and income elasticity estimates to constraining 
coefficients on lnP_salestax, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment, and state gov't spending to be constant across income classes, predictable tax 
change instrument specifications using combined federal-state price 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 





class  Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained 
0.02  -0.16  < $100K 
(0.67)  (0.67) 
0.00  -0.15  $100K - 
$200K  (0.60)  (0.59) 
-0.91  -0.87  $200K - 
$500K  (0.45)**  (0.46) 
-0.83  -0.99  $500K - 
$1M  (0.63)  (0.63) 








(0.43)***  (0.42)*** 
0.61  0.55 0.82  0.67  < $100K 
(0.21)***  (0.21)*** (0.35)**  (0.39)* 
0.47  0.43 0.58  0.46  $100K - 
$200K  (0.15)***  (0.15)*** (0.24)**  (0.27)* 
0.33  0.31 0.31  0.26  $200K - 
$500K  (0.11)***  (0.11)*** (0.14)**  (0.16) 
0.32  0.32 0.25  0.25  $500K - 
$1M  (0.11)***  (0.11)*** (0.09)***  (0.09)*** 




(0.14)***  (0.14)** (0.14)*** (0.13)*** 
All columns control for (age/100) squared and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects.  Columns labeled “constrained” control for lnP_salestax, , children, other dependents, 
ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, with coefficients on those variables constrained 
to be constant across income classes.  Columns labeled “unconstrained” interact lnP_salestax, , children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending with dummies for each income 
class.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance 
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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E. Income prediction regressions 
 
In Tables A.12 and A.13, we report estimates from the regressions that we run to 
construct the predicted values of future income that are in turn run through the tax calculator to 
help us construct the predictable tax change instruments for future changes in price and income.  
Table A.12 presents results for the specifications in which parameters are constrained to be 
constant across income groups, and Table A.13 presents the results when we allow for 
heterogeneity by income group.  Predicted values of income from the regression in Table A.12 
are used to construct the instruments used in the predictable tax change instrument specifications 
in Table 2 in the text.  Predicted values of income from the regression in Table A.13 are used to 
construct the instruments used in the predictable tax change specifications in Tables 3 and 4 in 
the text. The most striking pattern evident from these tables is the strong empirical confirmation 
of mean-reversion in income.  That is, positive lagged changes in income and high current levels 
of income both strongly predict a future decline in income.  The estimates also suggest that the 
characteristics of the tax system and demographic factors have strong partial associations with 
future income growth. 
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Table A.12 – Regression explaining change in pre-tax income between t and t+1, used to 
construct predictable tax change instruments in uniform parameters specifications 
-0.092  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.002)*** 
-0.292  ΔlnYit 
(0.002)*** 
-0.046  lnYit   
(0.001)*** 
0.066  ΔlnPit-1, 1
st-dollar 
(0.008)*** 
0.081  ΔlnPit, 1
st-dollar 
(0.009)*** 
-0.143  lnPit, 1st-dollar 
(0.008)*** 
-0.367  lnPit+1(Y’it) - 
lnPit(Y’it)  (0.019)*** 
0.696  ln[1-ATRit+1(Y’it)] – 
ln[1-ATRit(Y’it)]  (0.039)*** 
-0.436  mtrcgit, first dollar 
(0.013)*** 
-0.141  mtrcgit+1(Y’it) – 
mtrcgit, first dollar  (0.038)*** 
-0.003  age 
(0.000)*** 
0.269  (age/100) squared 
(0.044)*** 
0.020  children 
(0.001)*** 
0.005  other dependents 
(0.001)*** 
-0.564  lnP_salestax 
(0.072)*** 
-0.007  ln(state house price) 
(0.003)*** 
0.339  state unemployment 
(0.061)*** 
0.531  state gov't spending 
(0.035)*** 
0.032  married 
(0.003)*** 
0.601  constant 
(0.033)*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  R-squared is 0.12.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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Table A.13 – Regression explaining change in pre-tax income between t and t+1, used to 
construct predictable tax change instruments in heterogeneous specifications 















-0.159 -0.179 -0.177  -0.142 -0.054  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***  (0.002)*** 
-0.385 -0.447 -0.430  -0.397 -0.227  ΔlnYit 
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***  (0.002)*** 
-0.033 -0.011 -0.015  -0.021 -0.096  lnYit   
(0.006)*** (0.006)* (0.006)*** (0.007)***  (0.002)*** 
-0.183 -0.087 -0.010  0.003  0.026  ΔlnPit-1, 1
st-dollar 
(0.027)*** (0.028)***  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.012)** 
-0.349 -0.264 -0.118  0.067  0.065  ΔlnPit, 1st-dollar 
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)***  (0.014)*** 
0.202 0.099 -0.036 -0.039  -0.047  lnPit, 1st-dollar 
(0.030)*** (0.028)***  (0.021)* (0.022)*  (0.013)*** 
-0.009 -0.117 0.096  -0.133 -0.418  lnPit+1(Y’it) - 
lnPit(Y’it)  (0.084) (0.087)  (0.052)*  (0.052)**  (0.027)*** 
-0.517 -0.282 -0.127  0.685  0.800  ln[1-ATRit+1(Y’it)] – 
ln[1-ATRit(Y’it)]  (0.257)** (0.227)  (0.137) (0.113)***  (0.049)*** 
-0.239 -0.313 -0.520  -0.759 -0.983  mtrcgit, first dollar 
(0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.045)***  (0.032)*** 
-0.024 -0.025 -0.108  0.021 -0.418  mtrcgit+1(Y’it) – 
mtrcgit, first dollar  (0.078) (0.082) (0.095)  (0.134)  (0.093)*** 
-0.002 -0.005 -0.009  -0.006 0.004  age 
(0.001)** (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)*** 
0.025 0.300 0.637  0.407 -0.179  (age/100) squared 
(0.093) (0.108)***  (0.115)***  (0.135)***  (0.087)** 
0.006 0.016 0.020  0.016 0.033  children 
(0.003)** (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)***  (0.002)*** 
-0.002 0.004 0.005  -0.002 0.008  other dependents 
(0.002) (0.002)*  (0.002)** (0.003)  (0.002)*** 
0.274 -0.032 -0.709  -0.076 -0.757  lnP_salestax 
(0.146)  (0.153) (0.173)***  (0.215) (0.140)*** 
-0.001 -0.017 -0.012  -0.005 0.040  ln(state house price) 
(0.005) (0.005)***  (0.005)**  (0.007) (0.004)*** 
0.078 -0.124 0.110  0.356 1.114  state unemployment 
(0.127) (0.134) (0.147) (0.173)**  (0.121)*** 
0.186 0.230 0.556  0.545 1.288  state gov't spending 
(0.077)** (0.075)***  (0.084)*** (0.098)***  (0.067)*** 
0.015 0.015 0.041  0.015 0.017  married 
(0.005)*** (0.007)** (0.007)***  (0.009)  (0.006)*** 
Different columns show coefficients from a single regression where all explanatory variables are interacted with 
dummies for each income class.  Constant is 0.565 with a standard error of 0.048.  R-squared is 0.13.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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F. First stage regression example 
 
Table A.14 displays the coefficients on the excluded instruments for one example 
specification, the "predictable tax change instrument" approach using t+1 leads and that was 
shown in column (5) of Table 2 in the text.  The excluded instrument most closely associated 
with each endogenous (or measured-with-error) explanatory variable is highlighted in gray.  Not 
surprisingly, the instruments for lagged changes in log price and the current level of log price 
have high partial correlations with their endogenous counterparts from the second stage equation, 
as they are just first-dollar versions of those variables.  The more difficult identification 
challenge arises with the future changes in price and income.  In the first stage regression for 
ΔlnPt+1 in column (4) of Table A.14, the coefficient on the exogenous instrument for ΔlnPt+1 is 
0.204 with a standard error of 0.016; i.e., a one percent increase in the predictable component of 
future log price is associated with a 0.20 percent increase in actual future log price.  In column 
(5), the coefficient on the instrument for ΔlnYt+1 is 0.137 with a standard error of 0.015.  That is, 
a one percent increase in (1 – average tax rate) between year t and year t+1 is associated with an 
0.137 percent increase in after-tax income over that same time period.   That the instruments are 
highly statistically significant is reassuring.  Not surprisingly, given the existence of large 
unpredictable fluctuations in pre-tax income over time, the instruments seem to explain a 
relatively small portion of future changes in price and income.  The capital gains tax rate 
instruments help somewhat in this regard.  For instance, in column (5), where the dependent 
variable if future change in log income, a one percentage point increase in the future capital 
gains tax rate, holding the current rate constant, is estimated to lead to a future decline in income 
of 0.305 percent, with a standard error of 0.064.  This makes sense; if next year's capital gains 
rate is predicted to be higher than this year's rate, then people would tend to realize more income 
this year and less income next year, hence the decline in future income.  The coefficient on 
current capital gains marginal tax rate in column (5) is also a statistically significant -0.497, 
suggesting that holding future changes in capital gains tax rates constant, income tends to grow 
more slowly over time during periods when the capital gains marginal tax rate is high.  In 
column (4), where the dependent variable is future change in log price, the coefficient on 
predicted future change in capital gains marginal tax rate of positive 0.132 also makes sense; if 
next year's marginal tax rate on capital gains is higher than today's, more income gets realized   42
today relative to next year, which pushes taxpayers into a higher tax bracket today and a lower 
tax bracket next year (hence, the increase in price next year). 
 
Table A.14 -- Coefficients on excluded instruments in first stage regressions for specification in 
Table 2, column (5) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  ΔlnP it-1  ΔlnPit  lnPit  ΔlnPit+1  ΔlnYit+1 
0.799 0.030  0.001  0.051 0.122  ΔlnPit-1, 1st-dollar 
(0.016)*** (0.004)***  (0.003)  (0.005)*** (0.012)*** 
0.048  0.807 -0.033 0.093  0.169  ΔlnPit, 1
st-dollar 
(0.003)***  (0.017)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***  (0.020)*** 
-0.005 -0.047  0.855 -0.517 -0.394  lnPit, 1st-dollar 
(0.007) (0.009)***  (0.028)*** (0.014)*** (0.039)*** 
0.007 0.056  0.047  0.204 -0.061  lnPit+1(Y’it + eγˆ Zit) - 
lnPit(Y’it) (0.006)  (0.006)***  (0.008)*** (0.016)*** (0.039) 
0.001 -0.009  0.012  0.048 0.137  ln[1-ATRit+1(Y’it + eγˆ Zit)] – 
ln[1-ATRit(Y’it)]  (0.002) (0.002)***  (0.002)*** (0.005)***  (0.015)*** 
-0.025 -0.061  -0.086  0.297 -0.497  mtrcgit, first dollar 
(0.012)** (0.024)**  (0.038)**  (0.023)***  (0.076)*** 
0.019 0.039  0.021  0.132  -0.305  mtrcgit+1(Y’it + eγˆ Zit) – 
mtrcgit, first dollar  (0.010) (0.011)***  (0.013)  (0.022)***  (0.064)*** 
Partial R-squared of 
excluded instruments  0.499 0.483  0.582  0.222 0.004 
Shea partial R-squared  0.502  0.538  0.148  0.032  0.003 
P-value of F-test on 
excluded instruments  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
All columns also control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending.  Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
The bottom line is that although our instruments for the future price and income changes 
do not explain a huge portion of the rather noisy actual future changes in price and income, they 
have sensible signs and are highly statistically significant, and the identification is strong enough 
to avoid weak instruments bias.  In this specification, and all specifications reported in the paper 
and the appendix, the p-value on the Anderson canonical correlation test is 0.0000, meaning that 
it rejects the null hypothesis of weak identification.  The fact that our instruments explain a 
relatively small portion of the variation in future price and income changes is borne out by the 
low values of the Shea partial R-squared's for the future price and income changes.  But here we 
are helped greatly by the fact that weak instruments bias is a small-sample bias problem -- i.e., it   43
is a function of both the partial R-squared of the excluded instruments and the size of the sample, 
and we are using an enormous sample.   
 
G. Sensitivity to constant added to charitable giving 
 
In Tables A.15 through A.19, we examine the sensitivity of results reported in the text to 
the constant that was added to charitable giving when creating the dependent variable, supplying 
more detail relative to what we already showed in Table 5 in the text.  As noted in the text, the 
dependent variable used in the results reported in the paper is ln(charity+10).  We chose this 
approach to maintain comparability with the previous literature.  For instance, Auten, Sieg, and 
Clotfelter (2002) indicate that they also use ln(charity+10) as the dependent variable (this is 
specified in the appendix to their paper; see Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter 2000). Adding a constant 
to charity is necessary because 3.7 percent of returns in our estimation sample report zero 
charitable donations, and ln(0) is undefined.  Adding a larger constant has the potential 
advantage of reducing noise in the data caused by large changes in very small donations, but 
choosing too large of a constant would risk distorting the percentage changes in donations for a 
large share of the sample.  Only one percent of returns in our sample report charitable donations 
greater than $0 and less than $100.  But 15 percent of our estimation sample reports charitable 
giving greater than $100 and less than $1,000.  
Table A.15 shows the sensitivity to the size of the constant added to charity for the 
specification reported in column (1) and (2) of Table 2, which uses the predictable tax change 
instrument approach, constrains parameters to be constant across income classes, and uses 
separate federal and state prices. As noted in the test, the federal persistent price elasticity is 
quite sensitive to adding a very large constant to charity, changing from -0.391 with a constant of 
$1 to -0.009 with a constant of $1,000.  The elasticity of giving with respect to a future federal 
price change is also somewhat sensitive, falling from 0.526 to 0.306 when the constant added to 
charity is changed from $1 to $1,000.  The coefficient on federal ΔlnPit drops from 0.197 to 
0.049 when the constant added to charity changes from $1 to $1,000.  By contrast, estimates 
based on variation in the time path of taxes across states are more robust to the size of the 
constant added to charity. The state persistent price elasticity ranges from -1.163 when a constant 
of $1 is used to -0.990 when a constant of $1,000 is used.  The coefficient on state ΔlnPit is   44
almost completely unaffected by the size of constant added to charity.  Elasticities of giving with 
respect to persistent and future changes in income are quite sensitive to the size of constant 
added to charity in this specification, with both increasing substantially when a larger constant is 
used. 
 
Table A.15 -- Sensitivity to the constant added to charitable giving, specification in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 2 (predictable tax change instruments, parameters constrained to be constant 
across income classes, separate federal and state prices).  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable -> 
ln(charity+1) ln(charity+100) ln(charity+1000) 
0.025 0.020 -0.023  Federal ΔlnPit-1  
(0.055) (0.039) (0.035) 
0.197 0.146 0.049  Federal ΔlnPit 
(0.080)** (0.056)***  (0.050) 
-0.391 -0.255 -0.009  Federal lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.191)** (0.141)*  (0.121) 
0.526 0.362 0.306  Federal ΔlnPit+1 
(0.222)** (0.154)*  (0.126)* 
0.146 0.195 0.211  State ΔlnPit-1  
(0.090) (0.062)***  (0.052)*** 
0.567 0.570 0.571  State ΔlnPit 
(0.138)*** (0.104)*** (0.091)*** 
-1.163 -1.146 -0.990  State lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.299)*** (0.271)*** (0.279)*** 
0.364 0.130 0.083  State ΔlnPit+1 
(0.416) (0.356) (0.353) 
-0.056 -0.051 -0.043  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
-0.157 -0.122 -0.090  ΔlnYit 
(0.012)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** 
0.432 0.606 0.718  lnYit  [persistent income 
elasticity]  (0.116)*** (0.104)*** (0.109)*** 
-0.109 0.210 0.448  ΔlnYit+1  (0.154) (0.138)  (0.147)*** 
All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
In Table A.16, we formally test whether coefficients are statistically different depending 
on the size of the constant added to charity for the specification reported in columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 2.  To do this, we created two replicates of our estimation data set, and specified a 
single regression where the dependent variable was ln(charity+10) for all observations in one   45
replicate, and ln(charity + some other constant) for the other replicate.  The regression included 
the full set of explanatory variables twice, once interacted with a dummy for being in the first 
replicate, and once interacted with a dummy for being in the second replicate.  We also treated 
given taxpaying units in each replicate as different individuals for purposes of fixed effects 
analysis, and interacted the income / state categories used to compute clustered standard errors 
with dummies for which replicate the taxpaying unit was from as well.  This enabled us to 
estimate coefficients on the same variables for different values of constants added to the 
dependent variable in a single regression, which facilitated testing of the equality of coefficients 
depending on the size of the constant added to charity.  We verified that indeed, the coefficient 
estimates and standard errors for a given constant added to charity were identical to those 
reported in Table A.15.   
 
Table A.16 – P-values on tests where null hypothesis is equivalence of coefficients between 
selected specification and specification where $10 is added to charity, regression reported in 
Table 2, columns 1 and 2 (predictable tax change instruments, parameters constrained to be 
constant across income classes, separate federal and state prices).   
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable -> 
ln(charity+1) ln(charity+100) ln(charity+1000) 
0.9791 0.9018 0.3865  Federal ΔlnPit-1  
   
0.8766 0.6887 0.1128  Federal ΔlnPit 
   
0.8597 0.6734 0.0984  Federal lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]     
0.7714 0.7398 0.5419  Federal ΔlnPit+1 
   
0.8389 0.8028 0.6570  State ΔlnPit-1  
   
0.9970 0.9845 0.9823  State ΔlnPit 
   
0.9992 0.9642 0.6595  State lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]     
0.8391 0.8166 0.7467  State ΔlnPit+1 
   
0.8743 0.7651 0.2838  ΔlnYit-1 
   
0.3144 0.1447 0.0001  ΔlnYit 
   
0.6192 0.5219 0.1745  lnYit  [persistent income 
elasticity]     
0.4937 0.3708 0.0423  ΔlnYit+1       46
  As Table A.16 shows, in almost all cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality 
of coefficients across specifications that add different constants to charity at conventional levels 
of statistical significance.  The only exceptions are ΔlnYit, ΔlnYit+1, and the federal persistent 
price elasticity, where the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients between the specification 
where $10 is added to charity and the specification where $1,000 is added to charity can be 
rejected at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
  Table A.17 shows sensitivity to the size of the constant added to charity for the 
specification from column (5) of Table 2, which constrained all coefficients to be constant across 
income classes, used predictable tax change instruments, and used combined federal-state prices.  
The basic pattern is similar to that shown in Table A.15.  The combined federal-state persistent 
price elasticity drops from -0.63 to -0.35 when the size of the constant added to charity increases 
from $1 to $1,000, although as Table A.15 demonstrated above, this is mostly due to the 
sensitivity of the federal price elasticity to the size of the constant added to charity. 
 
Table A.17 -- Sensitivity to the constant added to charitable giving, specification in column 5 of 
Table 2 (predictable tax change instruments, parameters constrained to be constant across 
income classes, combined federal-state price).  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable -> 
ln(charity+1) ln(charity+100) ln(charity+1000) 
0.011 0.005 -0.035  ΔlnPit-1  
(0.056) (0.041) (0.038) 
0.208 0.153 0.062  ΔlnPit 
(0.079)*** (0.056)***  (0.051) 
-0.630 -0.548 -0.351  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.200)*** (0.165)***  (0.160)** 
0.296 0.055 -0.058  ΔlnPit+1 
(0.228) (0.179) (0.175) 
-0.062 -0.058 -0.052  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
-0.168 -0.134 -0.103  ΔlnYit 
(0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
0.504 0.721 0.865  lnYit  [persistent income 
elasticity]  (0.128)*** (0.119)*** (0.129)*** 
-0.036 0.339 0.618  ΔlnYit+1  (0.170) (0.157)**  (0.173)*** 
All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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  In Table A.18 we test the equality of coefficients across constants added to charity for the 
specifications shown in Table A.17, using the same procedure as in Table A.18.  In this case, we 
are only able to reject equality of coefficients between the specification adding $10 to charity 
and the one adding $1,000 to charity in the case of ΔlnYit and ΔlnYit+1. 
 
Table A.18 – P-values on tests where null hypothesis is equivalence of coefficients between 
selected specification and specification where $10 is added to charity, regression reported in 
Table 2, column 5 (predictable tax change instruments, parameters constrained to be constant 
across income classes, combined federal-state price).   
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable ->  ln(charity+1) ln(charity+100)  ln(charity+1000) 
0.9835 0.9014 0.4325  ΔlnPit-1  
   
0.8555 0.6763 0.1263  ΔlnPit 
   
0.9311 0.8079 0.2875  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]     
0.6995 0.6407 0.3671  ΔlnPit+1 
   
0.9159 0.8345 0.4114  ΔlnYit-1 
   
0.2198 0.0799 0.0000  ΔlnYit 
   
0.5781 0.4786 0.1336  lnYit  [persistent income 
elasticity]     
0.4682 0.3508 0.0377  ΔlnYit+1     
 
 
In Table A19 we show the sensitivity to the size of the constant added to charity of the 
persistent price elasticity for specifications reported in Table 3 in the text.  Evidence that the 
persistent price elasticity is large when identified by variation in the time paths of price across 
states is robust to adding different constants to charity; in the predictable tax change instrument 
specifications, the state persistent price elasticity ranges from -1.603 when $1 is added to charity, 
to -1.301 when $1,000 is added to charity.  In the perfect foresight specifications, the state 
persistent price elasticity ranges from -1.522 when $1 is added to charity, to -1.039 when $1,000 
is added to charity.  The federal persistent price elasticity, while still sensitive to the size of 
constant added to charity, remains relatively large across different constants added to charity.  In 
the predictable tax change specification, the federal persistent price elasticity ranges from -1.010 
when $1 is added to charity to -0.717 when $1,000 is added to charity. In the perfect foresight   48
specification, the federal persistent price elasticity changes from -1.056 to -0.683 when the size 
of the constant added to charity is changed from $1 to $1,000. 
 
 
   Table A.19 -- Sensitivity to the constant added to charitable giving of persistent price elasticity 
estimates reported in Table 3 (specifications allowing coefficients on all variables except price to 
differ by income class). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predictable tax change instruments  Perfect foresight 
Constant added to charity  Constant added to charity 
   $1 $100  $1,000  $1 $100  $1,000 
Separate federal and state prices 
-1.603 -1.446 -1.301 -1.522 -1.252 -1.039    State persistent 
  price elasticity  (0.637)** (0.533)***  (0.484)***  (0.222)*** (0.177)*** (0.154)*** 
-1.010 -0.822 -0.717 -0.949 -0.752 -0.600    Federal persistent 
  price elasticity  (0.485)** (0.389)** (0.337)**  (0.149)*** (0.117)*** (0.101)*** 
Combined federal and state prices 
-1.190 -1.010 -0.896 -1.056 -0.846 -0.683    Persistent price 
  elasticity  (0.502)** (0.410)** (0.364)**  (0.155)*** (0.124)*** (0.108)*** 
All columns control for lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
 
In Table A20 we show the sensitivity to the size of the constant added to charity of the 
persistent income elasticity for specifications reported in Table 3 in the text.  In the predictable 
tax change instrument specifications, persistent income elasticity estimates are not especially 
sensitive to the size of the constant added to charity in the top and bottom income classes, but 
there is still some sensitivity in between.  In the perfect foresight specifications, the sensitivity is 
the largest in the lowest income classes, and largely disappears in the higher income classes.
6 
    
 
 
                                                      
6 In the specifications where we allow coefficients to differ across income classes, we were unable to formally test 
the equality of coefficients across specifications that add different constants to charity using the procedures that we 
used to construct Tables A.16 and A.18, due to memory limitations on the computers we had to work with at the 
Treasury department.     49
Table A.20 – Sensitivity to the constant added to charitable giving of persistent income elasticity 
estimates reported in Table 3 (specifications allowing coefficients on all variables except price to 
differ by income class). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predictable tax change instruments  Perfect foresight 
Constant added to charity  Constant added to charity 
  $1 $100  $1,000  $1 $100  $1,000 
Separate federal and state prices 
0.511 0.664 0.620 0.525 0.326 0.149 
< $100K 
(0.260)** (0.173)***  (0.154)***  (0.054)*** (0.035)*** (0.027)*** 
0.343 0.557 0.561 0.425 0.385 0.266 
$100K - $200K 
(0.178)* (0.129)***  (0.117)***  (0.047)*** (0.035)*** (0.027)*** 
0.256 0.375 0.411 0.388 0.355 0.288 
$200K - $500K 
(0.124)** (0.098)***  (0.087)***  (0.046)*** (0.034)*** (0.027)*** 
0.285 0.318 0.350 0.446 0.389 0.333 
$500K - $1M 
(0.121)** (0.096)***  (0.088)***  (0.044)*** (0.031)*** (0.025)*** 
0.568 0.556 0.577 0.644 0.593 0.549 
≥ $1M 
(0.156)*** (0.130)*** (0.125)*** (0.029)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** 
Combined federal and state prices 
0.519 0.677 0.633 0.524 0.325 0.148 
< $100K 
(0.259)** (0.173)***  (0.154)***  (0.054)*** (0.036)*** (0.027)*** 
0.349 0.569 0.573 0.426 0.386 0.267 
$100K - $200K 
(0.179)* (0.129)***  (0.117)***  (0.047)*** (0.034)*** (0.027)*** 
0.267 0.394 0.432 0.399 0.364 0.295 
$200K - $500K 
(0.126)** (0.096)***  (0.085)***  (0.045)*** (0.033)*** (0.026)*** 
0.305 0.349 0.382 0.465 0.406 0.347 
$500K - $1M 
(0.123)** (0.097)***  (0.089)***  (0.042)*** (0.030)*** (0.024)*** 
0.585 0.584 0.608 0.665 0.611 0.564 
≥ $1M 
(0.159)*** (0.135)*** (0.130)*** (0.027)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
All columns control for lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Adding a constant to charity is inescapable in the log-log specification.  While our 
estimates do exhibit sensitivity to adding a very large constant to charity, our main finding that 
the elasticity of giving with respect to a persistent change in price is fairly large when identified 
by differences in the time path of price across states is robust to this arbitrary change.  
Nonetheless, given the apparent sensitivity of estimates to the size of the constant used, 
alternative methods for dealing with this issue may be a fruitful area for future research. We 
experimented with other functional forms, such as one that used the charity expenditure share 
(that is, price of charity times charitable donation divided by Y0) as the dependent variable.  
Unfortunately, we found that this approach created a large number of enormous outliers.  For 
example, while the mean value of expenditure share in the sample was about 0.04, about 0.2 
percent of the sample had expenditure shares greater than 1. Estimates were very sensitive to 
how these outliers were addressed.  This is partly driven by the fact that our data set heavily 
oversamples high-income people, some of whom make enormous donations, and because we are 
using a measure of charity that more closely reflects actual donations made in each year, instead 
of following the approach in the previous literature of using charitable deduction, which 
truncates very large donations that exceed the percentage of AGI limitations.  The log-log 
approach has the advantage of limiting the influence of large outlier donations on our estimates.  
A good systematic approach to addressing outlier problems would be to estimate censored 
quantile instrumental variable regressions, for example using the approach outlined in 
Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Kowalski (2008), but this approach was beyond the technical 
capabilities of our Treasury computer, especially in the presence of over 60,000 individual fixed 
effects, so for now we suggest this as a potential avenue for future research. 
 
 H. Sensitivity to treatment of donations that are not deductible in the year they are made 
 
In Table A.21, we investigate the effects of using alternative measures of charitable 
giving as the dependent variable.  In the specifications presented in the text, our dependent 
variable was defined as the current charitable deduction in year t, less carryovers from prior 
years, plus any carryovers claimed in the next two future years that various indicators suggest 
probably came from year t.  To facilitate comparisons, column (1) of Table A.21 repeats the 
estimates from the specification from Table 2, column (5).  In column (2), we show estimates of 
the same specification estimated on the same sample, except now the dependent variable is the   51
current charitable deduction (excluding current donations over the limits and including 
carryovers from prior years).  The persistent price elasticity is quite similar at about -0.61 under 
either specification, though the persistent income elasticity is slightly higher when current 
deduction is used as the dependent variable, 0.653 versus 0.602.  The direction of the effect is 
consistent with the bias we would expect from the mechanical relationship where people with 
higher incomes have larger charitable deductions because more of their charity fits under the 
percentage of AGI limitations.  One other notable difference is that when charitable deduction is 
used as the dependent variable, there is now a larger and marginally statistically significant 
elasticity of charitable giving with respect to a future price change, estimated at 0.359 with a 
standard error of 0.18.  Aside from that, Table A.20 suggests that using current charitable 
donation instead of current charitable deduction does not make a huge difference for the sample 
as a whole.   
In columns (3) and (4) of Table A.21, we investigate the effect of limiting our search for 
carryovers that may have been donated in year t to a two year window of future years instead of 
a five year window.  The drawback to using a longer window is that we must remove from the 
estimation sample observations from all of those future years.  The five year window leaves a 
much smaller sample and forces us to omit many whole years of data spanning tax reforms that 
provide some of the best sources of identification. In both columns (3) and (4) of Table A.20, we 
estimate the specification from Table 2, column (1) (which is reported again in column 1 of 
Table A.20, but limit the sample to those observations that have data for at least five consecutive 
future years.  Column (3) uses donations computed with a two year carryover window, and 
column (4) uses donations computed with a five year carryover window.  In column (3), limiting 
the sample to returns with five future years but using the two-year carryover window to compute 
donations affects the estimates slightly, with the most notable change being an increase in the 
persistent price elasticity from -0.607 to -0.700.  Comparing columns (3) and (4) of Table A.21 
demonstrates that switching from the two-year carryover window to the five-year carryover 
window, holding the estimation sample constant, has no significant effect on the estimates.   
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Table A.21 -- Sensitivity to using different measures of charity: specification in Table 2, column 
5 (predictable tax change instruments, parameters constrained to be constant across income 
classes, combined federal-state price)  





from next 2 
years (same 







next 2 years, 
sample limited 
to returns with 5 




from next 5 
years, sample 
limited to returns 
with 5 future 
years of data 
0.012 -0.041  -0.008  -0.002  ΔlnPit-1  
(0.047) (0.034)  (0.059)  (0.058) 
0.189 0.066  0.213  0.208  ΔlnPit 
(0.066)*** (0.049)  (0.096)**  (0.094)** 
-0.607 -0.610  -0.700  -0.725  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.179)*** (0.135)***  (0.159)***  (0.162)*** 
0.180 0.359  0.226  0.188  ΔlnPi, future 
(0.198) (0.180)**  (0.205)  (0.205) 
-0.061 -0.053  -0.056  -0.056  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.008)*** (0.005)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)*** 
-0.153 -0.093  -0.133  -0.137  ΔlnYit 
(0.008)*** (0.009)***  (0.015)***  (0.015)*** 
0.602 0.653  0.649  0.628  lnYit  [persistent 
income elasticity]  (0.120)*** (0.128)***  (0.182)***  (0.181)*** 
0.132 0.288  0.261  0.236  ΔlnYi, future  (0.158) (0.170)*  (0.232)  (0.230) 
Number of 
observations  330,396 330,396  133,199  133,199 










All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
 
  In Table A.22, we show how the construction of our charitable giving variable matters in 
a specification that allows coefficients on non-price variables to differ across income classes.  
Column (1) of Table A.22 again shows estimates from the specification in column (5) of Table 3, 
which allowed coefficients on non-price variables to differ across income classes, used 
predictable tax change instruments, and used combined federal-state prices.  Column (2) of Table 
A.22 shows estimates from the same specification but using charitable deduction in place of 
charitable donation as the dependent variable.  The persistent price elasticity is little affected, 
falling from -1.10 to -1.04 when we change from donation to deduction.  The standard error of   53
this estimate does drop substantially however, from 0.45 to 0.27, when we switch from donation 
to deduction, which is not surprising since using deductions reduces the variance of the 
dependent variable considerably by truncating very large donations that exceed the percentage of 
AGI limits.  By contrast, we find in this specification that estimates of the persistent income 
elasticity are quite sensitive to the use of deduction in place of donation.  For the bottom three 
income classes, persistent income elasticities are substantially larger when deduction is used in 
place of donation, whereas for the top two income groups persistent income elasticities are 
substantially smaller when deduction is used.  The direction of bias for the lower income classes 
is consistent with the mechanical relationship between income and deduction introduced by the 
percentage of AGI limitations – a larger income (AGI) allows one mechanically to deduct a 
larger share of one’s donations.  On the other hand, the fact that deductions are a truncated 
measure of donations in the case of very large donations could bias the estimated persistent 
income elasticity downwards to the extent that much of the positive association between income 
and donations incomes from very large lumpy donations.  This latter effect seems to dominate 
for the two highest income classes (above $500,000). 
 
Table A.22 – Sensitivity to using different measures of charity: specification in Table 3, column 
5 (predictable tax change instruments, allowing coefficients on all variables except price to differ 





Current donation using carryovers from next 
2 years (same as Table 3 column 5)  Current charitable deduction 
-1.10  -1.04  Persistent 
price  All 
(0.45)**  (0.27)*** 
-0.04  0.33  Future 
price  All 
(0.47)  (0.31) 
0.61  1.20  < $100K 
(0.21)***  (0.24)*** 
0.47  0.86  $100K - 
$200K  (0.15)***  (0.17)*** 
0.33  0.48  $200K - 
$500K  (0.11)***  (0.10)*** 
0.32  0.19  $500K - 
$1M  (0.11)***  (0.11)* 




(0.14)***  (0.15) 
All columns control for lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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  In Table A.23, we show the effect of using charitable deduction in place of donation for 
the specification from column (5) of Table 4, which allowed coefficients on all variables to differ 
by income class, and used predictable tax change instruments and combined federal-state price.  
Persistent price elasticities are not much affected, and persistent income elasticities are affected 
in a similar manner to that discussed in relation to Table A.22. 
Table A.23 – Sensitivity to using different measures of charity: specification in Table 4, column 
5 (predictable tax change instruments, allowing coefficients on all variables to differ by income 





Current donation using carryovers from 
next 2 years (same as Table 4 column 5)  Current charitable deduction 
0.02  0.04  < $100K 
(0.67)  (0.61) 
0.00  -0.02  $100K - 
$200K  (0.60)  (0.46) 
-0.91  -0.78  $200K - 
$500K  (0.45)**  (0.29)*** 
-0.83  -1.08  $500K - 
$1M  (0.63)  (0.35)*** 




(0.43)***  (0.32)*** 
1.79  1.94  < $100K 
(1.07)*  (1.03)* 
1.59  1.60  $100K - 
$200K  (1.05)  (0.83)* 
-0.25  0.16  $200K - 
$500K  (0.62)  (0.40) 
0.11  0.08  $500K - 
$1M  (0.81)  (0.51) 




(0.43)  (0.37) 
0.82 1.02  < $100K 
(0.35)** (0.30)*** 
0.58 0.70  $100K - 
$200K  (0.24)** (0.21)*** 
0.31 0.33  $200K - 
$500K  (0.14)** (0.10)** 
0.25 0.11  $500K - 






All columns control for full set of price and income variables, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted 
with dummies for each income class, along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income 
class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.   55
 
I. Sensitivity of standard error estimates to clustering scheme 
 
In Table A.24, we investigate whether the clustering scheme used in our preferred 
specification, in which observations were clustered by state and by five income classes, 
appreciably affects estimated standard errors.  Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) suggest 
that the clustering scheme should match the source of identifying variation for the key 
explanatory variable, and in our study the identifying variation comes from differing time paths 
across income levels and states (and to some extent across marital status) in federal and state tax 
rates.  Our estimation procedure, which makes use of Stata’s xtivreg2, (Schaffer 2007) requires 
that there be at least as many clusters as there are exogenous instruments in the system; Baum, 
Schaffer, and Stillman (2003) explain why this is an econometric requirement.  Column (1) of 
Table A.24 presents the coefficient estimates on the price and income variables from the 
specification in column (5) of Table 2, and for ease of comparison, column (2) presents the 
standard errors using the clustering scheme noted above.  To examine whether the standard 
errors are sensitive to the clustering scheme, in column (3) standard errors are computed with 
clustering by 50 equal income quantiles of the unweighted sample distribution of average income 
over time (that is, average income for the taxpaying unit falls in the top 2 percent, average 
income falls in the next 2 percent, etc), but not by state.  In column (4), observations are 
clustered by into 21 income classes (less than $50,000, $50,000 to $100,000, etc. up to $950,000 
to $1 million, and greater than $1 million, again based on average income of the taxpayer) 
interacted with marital status.  In column (5), observations are clustered according to the modal 
state of residence of the taxpayer, with no clustering by income.  Finally, in column (6) non-
robust standard errors with no clustering are presented.  Looking across these columns, the 
specification presented in the text results in the most conservative standard errors for most 
coefficients, and this is especially true for our most important parameter estimate, the persistent 
price elasticity.  For two coefficients (the twice lagged price difference and the once lagged 
income difference), at least one alternative clustering scheme yields a slightly higher standard 
error, but the difference is too small to affect the significance of these estimates. 
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Table A.24 -- Explaining log charitable giving: sensitivity to clustering scheme of standard 
errors in Table 2, Column 5 (predictable tax change instruments, parameters constrained to be 
constant across income classes, combined federal-state price) 











































ΔlnPit-1   0.012 0.047  0.049  0.041  0.042  0.041 
ΔlnPit  0.189 0.066  0.057  0.051  0.054  0.051 
lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity] 
-0.607 0.179 0.118  0.122  0.146  0.122 
ΔlnPi, future  0.180 0.198  0.130  0.167  0.166  0.167 
ΔlnYit-1  -0.061 0.008 0.007  0.006  0.008  0.006 
ΔlnYit  -0.153 0.008 0.010  0.009  0.010  0.009 
lnYit  [persistent 
income elasticity] 
0.602 0.120  0.112  0.091  0.118  0.091 
ΔlnYi, future  0.132  0.158 0.144 0.125 0.156 0.125 
 
All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending.  Income classes are defined 
based on the taxpaying unit’s mean real income over the time period the taxpaying unit is included in the sample.  
The income classes in column (2) are: less than $100,000; $100,000 - $200,000; $200,000 - $500,000; $500,000 - $1 
million; and greater than $1 million.  The income quantiles in column (3) are computed based on the un-weighted 
distribution of individual mean incomes, and each of the 50 quantiles contains 2 percent of the distribution.  The 
income classes in column (4) are $50,000 increments up to $1 million, plus income over $1 million.   
 
J. Sensitivity to using two-year-ahead changes in price and income 
 
  In Table A.25, we show estimates for specifications identical to those shown in Table 2 
in the text, except that we use changes in price and income between t and t+2 instead of between 
t and t+1.  In the perfect foresight specifications, this simply entails including the actual value of 
(lnY0it+2 - lnY0it) directly in the specification, and using the actual change in first-dollar log price 
between t and t+2 as an instrument for the actual change in last-dollar price over that period.  In 
the predictable tax change instrument specifications, we assume that taxpayers know about any 
federal tax reform that has already been enacted in year t, and also know about any reform that 
will take effect starting in year t+1. So for example, we assume that taxpayers in 1986 know 
about TRA86 because it was enacted before the end of the year, and they knew what effect it will 
have in 1987 and 1988. However, we assume that people did not anticipate TRA86 in 1985. This   57
rule also means that we assume that people in 1992 already know about the federal tax changes 
enacted in 1993, including their implications for taxes in 1994, and in 2002 already know about 
the federal tax changes that would be enacted in 2003, including their implications for taxes in 
2004. For state tax reforms, we assume that people know about any changes in state tax 
parameters that will begin to apply next year, but do not know about changes that begin to apply 
two years or more in the future. 
  Table A.25 demonstrates that when coefficients are constrained to be constant across 
income classes, estimates of the persistent price elasticity are broadly similar but somewhat 
smaller than those reported in Table 2, while point estimates of the response to a future price 
change are somewhat larger than in Table 2.  Standard errors are considerably larger than in 
Table 2, especially in the predictable tax change instrument specifications. 
 
Table A.25 – Sensitivity to using two-year-ahead changes in price and income: specifications 
from Table 2 (specifications assuming all coefficients are uniform across income classes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Separate federal and state prices 
 
Predictable  










0.015 0.151 0.007 0.136 0.001 0.017  ΔlnPit-1  
(0.046) (0.076)** (0.042)  (0.075)*  (0.047)  (0.040) 
0.159 0.537 0.146 0.513 0.170 0.189  ΔlnPit 
(0.065)** (0.118)** (0.064)**  (0.116)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)*** 
-0.157 -0.993 -0.217 -0.730 -0.558 -0.580  lnPit [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.276) (0.596)* (0.207)  (0.327)** (0.308)*  (0.088)*** 
0.544 0.408 0.457 0.682 0.181 0.190  ΔlnPi,t+1 
(0.288)* (0.639)  (0.195)**  (0.384)* (0.316)  (0.042)*** 
-0.054 -0.055  -0.061  -0.060  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.008)*** (.008)  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
-0.141 -0.143  -0.154  -0.156  ΔlnYit 
(0.010)*** (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.007)*** 
0.539 0.554  0.660  0.554  lnYit [persistent 
income elasticity]  (0.152)*** (0.023)***  (0.168)***  (0.019)*** 
0.066 0.080  0.179  0.057  ΔlnYi,t+1  (0.172) (0.017)***  (0.186)  (0.008)*** 
All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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  Table A.26 shows estimated price and income elasticities from specifications similar to 
those in Table 3 in the text, but using two-year-ahead changes in price and income.  In the 
perfect foresight specifications elasticity estimates and degree of statistical significance are 
broadly similar to what we found in Table 3.  The point estimate for the state persistent price 
elasticity is somewhat smaller when we use two-year-ahead changes, at -1.22 compared to -1.40, 
but actually has a smaller standard error at 0.16 compared to 0.2.  In the predictable tax change 
instrument specifications, by contrast, the use of two-year-ahead changes in price and income 
dramatically increases standard errors.  Nonetheless, the state persistent price elasticity remains 
large (-1.888) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level (with a standard error of 0.917). 
  Table A.27 depicts estimated price elasticities from specifications similar to those in 
Table 4 in the text, but using two-year-ahead changes in price and income.  Once again in the 
perfect foresight specifications the persistent price elasticity estimates and standard errors are 
largely similar whether we use one-year-ahead or two-year-ahead changes in price and income.  
In the predictable tax change instrument specifications, the point estimates for persistent price 
elasticities are broadly similar between Table A.27 and Table 4, but the standard errors are much 
larger in Table A.27, reflecting the rather demanding nature of this particular econometric 
approach. 
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Table A.26 -- Sensitivity to using two-year-ahead changes in price and income: specifications in 
Table 3 (estimates allowing coefficients on all non-price variables to differ across income 
classes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Separate federal and state prices 
Predictable  











-0.671 -1.888 -0.813 -1.216 -0.970 -0.892  Persistent 
price  All 
(0.654) (0.917)**  (0.114)***  (0.155)*** (0.678) (0.117)*** 
0.359 -0.610 0.150 0.139 0.088 0.138  Future 
price  All 
(0.593) (0.892)  (0.048)***  (0.087) (0.613)  (0.051)*** 
0.589 0.464  0.627  0.460  < $100K 
(0.216)*** (0.041)***  (0.217)***  (0.042)*** 
0.461 0.432  0.495  0.430  $100K - 
$200K  (0.180)** (0.038)***  (0.181)***  (0.038)*** 
0.307 0.390  0.349  0.395  $200K - 
$500K  (0.154)** (0.040)***  (0.156)**  (0.039)*** 
0.290 0.442  0.343  0.452  $500K - 
$1M  (0.180) (0.037)***  (0.181)*  (0.037)*** 




(0.223)** (0.026)***  (0.222)***  (0.025)*** 
0.240 0.049  0.274  0.048  < $100K 
(0.275) (0.021)**  (0.278)  (0.021)** 
0.102 0.047  0.135  0.046  $100K - 
$200K  (0.253) (0.017)***  (0.253)  (0.016)*** 
-0.062 0.036  -0.026  0.035  $200K - 
$500K  (0.227) (0.014)***  (0.230)  (0.013)*** 
-0.284 0.035  -0.231  0.035  $500K - 
$1M  (0.241) (0.014)**  (0.242)  (0.015)** 




(0.239) (0.013)***  (0.239)  (0.014)*** 
All columns control for lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state 
unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table A.27 -- Sensitivity to using two-year-ahead changes in price and income: specifications in 
Table 4: (estimates allowing coefficients on all variables including price to differ across income 
classes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Separate federal and state prices 
Predictable  











-0.191 -0.013 -0.783 -0.915 0.041 -0.799  < $100K 
(0.889) (0.879)  (0.187)***  (0.219)*** (0.751) (0.172)*** 
0.642 -0.225 -0.761 -1.012 0.353 -0.802  $100K - 
$200K  (0.968) (0.936)  (0.155)***  (0.238)*** (0.811) (0.156)*** 
-0.552 -1.222 -0.758 -1.090 -0.799 -0.823  $200K - 
$500K  (0.754) (0.809)  (0.126)***  (0.172)*** (0.671) (0.125)*** 
-0.351 -1.127 -0.772 -1.029 -0.731 -0.820  $500K - 
$1M  (0.865) (0.952)  (0.164)***  (0.171)*** (0.808) (0.159)*** 




(0.673) (0.985)*  (0.179)***  (0.198)*** (0.630)* (0.172)*** 
0.865 1.130 0.209 -0.188 1.206 0.161  < $100K 
(0.994) (1.165)  (0.096)**  (0.152) (0.838) (0.091) 
2.069 1.022 -0.003  -0.128 1.836 -0.025  $100K - 
$200K  (1.394) (1.400) (0.088) (0.151) (1.146) (0.088) 
0.135 -0.475 0.105 -0.067 -0.075 0.071  $200K - 
$500K  (0.851) (0.958) (0.073) (0.112) (0.740) (0.072) 
0.563 -0.374 0.043 -0.197 0.135 0.005  $500K - 
$1M  (0.996) (1.132) (0.112) (0.137) (0.904) (0.113) 




(0.662) (0.987)  (0.087)***  (0.134)*** (0.580) (0.089)*** 
All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnYit, ΔlnYit+1, ΔlnPit-1, ΔlnPit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each 
interacted with dummies for each income class, along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state 
and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  61
K. Sensitivity to possibility that marginal charitable donations may never be deducted 
 
Joulfaian (2001) emphasizes that among very wealthy elderly taxpayers, the aggregate 
value of charitable contributions exceeds the aggregate amount deducted by a large amount, due 
to limits on charitable deductions as a percentage of AGI.  This raises the possibility that a 
marginal contribution may never be deductible, which has implications for the price of giving.  
Among the subset of our sample for which five future years of data are available, 0.17 percent of 
returns are up against the 50 percent of AGI limit in the current year and each of the next five 
years, and so will never be able to deduct a marginal contribution.  This is a small fraction of our 
sample, but these taxpayers give unusually large amounts to charity, and so account for a large 
share of charitable donations in the sample.  When we use a measure of charitable contributions 
that reallocates carryovers from a five year window back to their likely origin year, taxpayers 
who are unlikely to ever deduct the marginal contribution account for 12.6 percent of 
contributions. 
In all specifications reported in the text, if the taxpayer is up against the 50% of AGI limit 
for total charitable contributions in a given year, then that year’s price is replaced with the 
following year’s price.  So for example, if the taxpayer is up against the 50% of AGI limit both 
this year and next year, then in constructing the price, the ordinary marginal tax rate at which the 
contribution is deducted (but not the capital gains or AMT marginal rate) will be set to zero, 
because the marginal contribution is not deductible in either year.  The instruments for price, 
however, are calculated on a “first-dollar basis” (that is, they are based on the marginal tax rates 
on the first dollar of charitable giving), which is unaffected by whether the marginal contribution 
is above the 50% of AGI limit.  Directly using information on whether a taxpayer gave such a 
large contribution as to exceed the 50% of AGI limit to help construct the instruments for price 
would introduce substantial endogeneity.    
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Table A.28 -- Explaining log charitable giving: sensitivity of estimates in Table 2, column 5, to 
possibility that marginal charitable donation may never be deducted; fixed effects estimates with 
predictable tax change instruments, t+1 changes in price and income, and uniform parameters 
and time effects 
 




If charity > 49% of AGI 
this year and next 2 
years, price is calculated 
assuming marginal 
donation will never be 
deducted; price 
instruments multiply 
benefit of deduction by 
(1 -  predicted probability 
of never being able to 
deduct) 
If charity > 49% of AGI this year 
and next 2 years, or sum of 
carryovers and non-cash giving > 
29% of AGI this year and next two 
years,  price is calculated assuming 
marginal donation will never be 
deducted; price instruments 
multiply benefit of deduction by (1 
-  predicted probability of never 
being able to deduct) 
0.012  0.014 0.014  ΔlnPit-1  
(0.047)  (0.046) (0.046) 
0.189  0.191 0.193  ΔlnPit  (0.066)***  (0.065)*** (0.066)*** 
-0.607  -0.595 -0.594  lnPit  [persistent  
price elasticity] (0.179)***  (0.180)*** (0.181)*** 
0.180  0.190 0.197  ΔlnPi, future  (0.198)  (0.199) (0.200) 
-0.061  -0.060 -0.061  ΔlnYit-1  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
-0.153  -0.153 -0.152  ΔlnYit  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
0.602  0.595 0.597  lnYit  [persistent 
income elasticity] (0.120)***  (0.120)*** (0.119)*** 
0.132  0.125 0.128  ΔlnYi, future  (0.158)  (0.158) (0.157) 
 
All columns control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other 
dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
   
To examine the robustness of our estimates to how the price of giving is calculated for 
these taxpayers, we run two specification checks, which are presented in Table A.28.  First, using 
the sample of taxpayers for whom five full years of future data are available, we estimated a 
probit model where the dependent variable is equal to one if a taxpayer’s charitable contributions 
in each of the next five years are above 49 percent of AGI, in which case a current marginal 
contribution will never be deductible, and zero otherwise.  The explanatory variables included 
the full set of exogenous instruments except replacing the year dummies and fixed effects with 
age and marital status.  Then, when constructing the instruments for price, we multiplied the   63
marginal tax rate at which donations are deducted by one minus the predicted probability from 
the probit model of never getting to deduct the contribution.  Thus, our price instruments in this 
specification take into account the fact that there is some probability that donations will never be 
deducted, and this probability is higher, for example, for higher-income people.  We estimate a 
model similar to that in Table 2, column (5) on the full estimation sample, and the (endogenous) 
price variables are all constructed assuming the marginal contribution is never deducted if 
charity is greater than 49 percent of AGI this year and each of the next two years.   The estimates 
from this specification are shown in Table A.28 column (2); column (1) shows the estimates 
from Table 2 column (5) for comparison.     
Our method of accounting for the possibility of never deducting contributions has very 
little effect on the estimates.  In column (3), we perform an exercise similar to that in column (2), 
but use a more conservative indicator of whether a marginal contribution will ever be deducted.  
Here, in the probit to construct the predicted probability of never deducting the marginal 
contribution that is used to construct the instruments for price, and in the construction of the 
endogenous price variables, we assume a marginal contribution is not deductible if charitable 
contributions exceed 49 percent of AGI and the sum of non-cash carryovers and non-cash giving 
(which are generally limited to 30 percent of AGI) exceed 29 percent of AGI.  Again, the 
estimates are very similar.  This is not surprising given the very small percentage of taxpayers 
who never get to deduct their marginal contributions in the sample.  Nonetheless, as noted above, 
although the share of taxpayers who never deduct their marginal contribution is small, they do 
account for a disproportionate share contributions (an unweighted value of 12.6 percent in our 
disproportionately high-income sample), which is important.  For instance, if one were to 
perform simulations of the effect of repealing the deduction for charitable contributions on 
aggregate contributions, this should be taken into account.  A more satisfying response to this 
issue would involve explicitly modeling the nonlinear budget constraint in a dynamic setting, 
which is very challenging but may be a good avenue for future research. 
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L. Sensitivity of estimates in heterogeneous parameters specifications to method of 
controlling for unobservable time-varying factors that differ across income classes 
  
  In Tables A.29 through A.33, we show the sensitivity of our estimates to different 
methods of controlling for time-varying unobservable influences on charity that differ across 
income classes.  In Tables 3 and 4, we did this by including separate year dummies for each 
income class.  In A.29, we adapt the predictable tax change instrument specifications from Table 
3 using two alternative approaches, both of which allow coefficients on all variables other than 
the prices and year dummies to differ by income class.  In columns (1), (2), and (5), we constrain 
the coefficients on year dummies to be constant across income classes (we call this the “common 
time effect” approach).  While this still removes the average time-series variation in federal tax 
rates from identification, it preserves identification arising from the fact that federal tax rates 
changed in different ways over time for different income groups. On the other hand, it has the 
drawback that it does nothing to control for omitted influences on charity that may have been 
changing in different ways over time for people at different income levels.  In columns (3), (4) 
and (6), we omit year dummies altogether and replace them with an income class-specific 
quadratic time trend and an income-class specific effect of the log real S&P500. This approach 
restores identification for price variation coming from the fact that federal tax rates changed over 
time within an income class in ways that did not conform to a smooth quadratic time trend. Thus, 
for example, most of the identification arising from the relatively sharp discrete changes in 
federal tax rates arising from TRA86 and the 1993 federal tax increase are preserved in this 
specification. 
  Under either approach, the state persistent price elasticity estimates remain large and 
statistically significant, but are now closer to those reported in Table 2, at -1.119 with common 
time effects or -1.015 with income-class-specific quadratic time trends.  The federal persistent 
price elasticity estimates are part way between those in Table 2 and those in Table 3.  In the 
common time effect approach, the federal persistent price elasticity estimate is -0.605.   This 
suggests that the inclusion of separate year dummies for each income class accounts for roughly 
half of the increase in federal persistent price elasticity from -0.35 in Table 2 to -0.92 in Table 3, 
with the rest due to allowing coefficients on other variables (particularly income and age/100 
squared, as evidenced by Table A.11) to differ across income classes.  In the income-class-  65
specific quadratic time trend approach, the persistent federal price elasticity estimate is -0.553; 
so allowing for unobservable influences on charity that follow different time paths at different 
income levels, but which follow a restrictive smooth quadratic path over time, leads to smaller 
estimates of both the federal and state persistent price elasticity than the more flexible approach 
of allowing different year dummies for each income class.  Nonetheless, our basic conclusion 
that persistent price elasticities identified by differences in time paths of price across state are 
large remains robust. 
  Interestingly, evidence of responsiveness to future changes in federal price is restored 
when we use these more restrictive methods of controlling for omitted time-varying influences 
on charity, since these methods preserve most of the really large obvious discrete changes in 
federal tax rates in the identifying variation for this parameter.  With common time effects, the 
elasticity of charity with respect to a future federal price increase is 0.39 with a standard error of 
0.24, which is marginally significant with a P-value of 0.11.  With income-class-specific 
quadratic time trends, the elasticity of charity with respect to a future federal price increase is 
0.44 with a standard error of 0.12.  When we use combined federal-state prices and income-
class-specific quadratic time trends, in column (6), the elasticity of giving with respect to a future 
price increase is 0.42 with a standard error of 0.12.   
  Across all specifications reported in Table A.29, persistent income elasticities tend to be 
smaller than those in the corresponding specifications in Table 3 in the text.  A possible 
explanation could be that the specifications in Table A.29 do less to control for factors associated 
with predictable differences between current and future income (for example, Table A.29 
controls for life-cycle variation in a less flexible fashion than Table 3), so our persistent income 
elasticity estimates in Table A.29 may be mixing in small responses to transitory variation in 
income with larger responses to persistent variation to a greater degree than those in Table 3. 
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Table A.29 – Sensitivity to alternative methods of controlling for unobservable time-varying 
influences: predictable tax change instrument specifications from Table 3 (estimates allowing 
coefficients on all non-price variables to differ across income classes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Separate federal and state prices 
Common time effects 
Separate quadratic  
time trends &  
log real S&P500  










trends & log 
real S&P500  
for each income 
class 
-0.605 -1.119 -0.553 -1.015 -0.803  -0.631  Persistent 
price  All 
(0.262)** (0.422)***  (0.127)***  (0.289)*** (0.262)***  (0.119)*** 
0.392 0.403 0.443 0.272 0.297  0.425  Future 
price  All 
(0.244) (0.512)  (0.123)***  (0.361) (0.246) (0.120)*** 
0.400 0.369  0.474  0.342  < $100K 
(0.171)** (0.123)***  (0.169)***  (0.119)*** 
0.376 0.316  0.422  0.281  $100K - 
$200K  (0.138)*** (0.107)***  (0.134)***  (0.104)*** 
0.342 0.249  0.365  0.205  $200K - 
$500K  (0.109)*** (0.102)**  (0.106)***  (0.100)** 
0.359 0.231  0.369  0.178  $500K - 
$1M  (0.095)*** (0.104)**  (0.091)***  (0.101)* 




(0.095)*** (0.111)***  (0.085)***  (0.101)*** 
0.059 0.069  0.225  0.049  < $100K 
(0.352) (0.223)  (0.351)  (0.219) 
-0.187 -0.103  -0.041  -0.136  $100K - 
$200K  (0.344) (0.235)  (0.341)  (0.234) 
-0.319 -0.292  -0.297  -0.371  $200K - 
$500K  (0.210) (0.202)  (0.207)  (0.205)* 
-0.409 -0.569  -0.438  -0.669  $500K - 
$1M  (0.155)*** (0.205)***  (0.148)***  (0.203)*** 




(0.113) (0.143)  (0.101)  (0.131)** 
All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state 
house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, each interacted with dummies for each income class, 
along with fixed effects, ΔlnPit-1, and ΔlnPit,. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are in 
parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
In Table A.30, we report estimates from specifications similar to those reported in Table 
4 of the text, allowing coefficients on all variables except price to differ by income class, except 
that we constrain coefficients on all year dummies to be constant across income classes (the 
“common time effect” approach).  The perfect foresight state persistent price elasticity estimates   67
tend to be broadly similar to those reported in Table 4, with estimates ranging from -0.884 with a 
standard error of -1.636 with a standard error of 0.160 in the highest income class.  The perfect 
foresight federal persistent price elasticity estimates are also broadly similar but somewhat 
smaller in the upper income classes and larger in the lower income classes compared to Table 4.  
In the predictable tax change instrument specifications, persistent price elasticities in the bottom 
two income classes are much larger in absolute value compared to what we found in Table 4, 
with point estimates closer to those for upper income people, but standard errors remain very 
large.  The persistent federal and state price elasticities for the top three income classes in the 
predictable tax change instrument specification are somewhat smaller than in the corresponding 
specification in Table 4.  Nonetheless the state persistent price elasticity for millionaires remains 
large at -1.22 with a standard error of 0.47. 
Table A.31 shows estimates similar to those in Table 4 but this time using income-class 
specific quadratic time trends and ln real S&P500 effects in place of year dummies.   
In Table A.31, where we substitute income-class-specific quadratic time trends for year 
dummies, state persistent price elasticities in the perfect foresight specification remain large for 
all income classes, ranging from -0.748 with a standard error of 0.218 in the lowest income class 
to -1.391 with a standard error of 0.141 in the highest income class.  Perfect foresight fedreal 
persistent price elasticity estimates are a bit smaller than they were in Table 4.  In the predictable 
tax change instrument specifications, the persistent price elasticity estimates are rather sensitive 
to this alternative method of controlling for time-varying omitted influences on charity, but state 
and overall persistent price elasticity estimates for millionaires remain large, at -1.108 and -
0.917, repsectively.   
Table A.31 suggests stronger evidence of responsiveness of current giving to future price 
changes among upper-income people compared to Table 4, especially in the predictable tax 
change instrument specifications.  For example, in column (5) of Table A.31 the elasticity of 
current giving with respect to an increase in next year’s price is 0.561 with a standard error of  
0.206 in the $500,000 to $1 million income range, and 0.427 with a standard error of 0.147 for 
millionaires.     68
Table A.30 – Price elasticity estimates when coefficients on all variables except year dummies 
are allowed to differ across income classes (common time effects) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Separate federal and state prices 
Predictable  











-0.889 -0.264 -1.035 -0.884 -1.082 -0.973  < $100K 
(0.680) (0.805)  (0.176)***  (0.213)*** (0.679) (0.160)*** 
-0.299 -0.631 -0.835 -1.034 -0.660 -0.885  $100K - 
$200K  (0.433) (0.608)  (0.151)***  (0.220)*** (0.477) (0.151)*** 
-0.631 -0.804 -0.701 -1.139 -0.802 -0.781  $200K - 
$500K  (0.310)** (0.410)**  (0.122)***  (0.170)*** (0.311)*** (0.124)*** 
-0.532 -0.648 -0.617 -1.074 -0.698 -0.700  $500K - 
$1M  (0.267)** (0.377)*  (0.114)***  (0.153)*** (0.266)*** (0.117)*** 




(0.217)*** (0.465)*** (0.132)*** (0.160)*** (0.216)*** (0.132)*** 
0.687 1.436 0.068 -0.012 0.668 0.082  < $100K 
(0.907) (1.337) (0.089) (0.149) (0.883) (0.082) 
1.123 0.281 0.055 -0.086 0.743 0.030  $100K - 
$200K  (0.715) (1.346) (0.092) (0.155) (0.783) (0.091) 
0.146 0.083 0.065 -0.265 0.028 0.015  $200K - 
$500K  (0.420)  (0.741)  (0.083) (0.115)** (0.404)  (0.081) 
0.387 0.433 0.121 -0.340 0.284 0.055  $500K - 
$1M  (0.302) (0.596) (0.092)  (0.124)***  (0.292) (0.089) 




(0.214)* (0.578)  (0.103)*** (0.103)  (0.197)  (0.099)** 
All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnYit, ΔlnYit+1, ΔlnPit-1, ΔlnPit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, each interacted with 
dummies for each income class, along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income 
class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  69
Table A.31 – Price elasticity estimates controlling for separate quadratic time trends and log real 
S&P500 effects for each income class in place of year dummies, and allowing coefficients on all 
other variables to differ across income classes  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Separate federal and state prices 
Predictable  











-0.713 0.050 -0.800 -0.748 -0.379 -0.741  < $100K 
(0.496) (0.578)  (0.169)***  (0.218)*** (0.425) (0.153)*** 
-0.028 -0.362 -0.571 -0.840 -0.102 -0.607  $100K - 
$200K  (0.290) (0.471)  (0.138)***  (0.218)*** (0.287) (0.136)*** 
-0.474 -0.495 -0.558 -0.943 -0.456 -0.619  $200K - 
$500K  (0.186)** (0.328)  (0.098)***  (0.162)*** (0.161)*** (0.099)*** 
-0.275 -0.344 -0.453 -0.805 -0.295 -0.524  $500K - 
$1M  (0.167)* (0.282)  (0.104)***  (0.148)*** (0.146)** (0.104)*** 




(0.138)*** (0.348)*** (0.127)*** (0.141)*** (0.113)*** (0.114)*** 
0.457 1.750 0.109 -0.014 0.949 0.115  < $100K 
(0.755) (1.137) (0.090) (0.152) (0.699) (0.082) 
0.845 0.053 0.076 -0.098 0.833 0.045  $100K - 
$200K  (0.570) (1.185) (0.093) (0.154) (0.569) (0.092) 
0.112 0.365 0.109 -0.179 0.198 0.060  $200K - 
$500K  (0.312) (0.754) (0.081) (0.114) (0.286) (0.080) 
0.554 0.548 0.190 -0.249 0.561 0.115  $500K - 
$1M  (0.227)** (0.513) (0.091)**  (0.121)** (0.206)***  (0.087) 




(0.161)*** (0.432) (0.097)***  (0.096)** (0.147)***  (0.089)*** 
All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnYit, ΔlnYit+1, ΔlnPit-1, ΔlnPit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, each interacted with 
dummies for each income class, along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income 
class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
A drawback of the specifications shown in Table A.31 is that they do not control for 
unobservable time varying influences on charitable giving in a very flexible fashion, so that we 
might worry that, for example, our estimates of the effects of persistent price and income 
changes could be confounded with the effects of other factors that were changing over time in a 
fairly non-linear way. At the same time, because we are not controlling for time effects in a 
completely flexible way, this identification strategy does a good job of pinpointing the times 
when there was a really large incentive to re-time giving. The estimate of a large response among 
very high income people to obvious timing incentives around TRA86 and the 1993 tax change   70
seems reasonable -- for instance, there is no other apparent reason for there to be a spike in 
charitable giving in 1986. 
In Table A.32, we explore the sensitivity of the estimates in the predictable tax change 
specifications from Table A.31 to the degree of flexibility allowed in the income-class-specific 
time trend.  In columns (1), (2), and (5) of Table A.32 we use income-class-specific linear time 
trends, and in columns (3), (4), and (6) we use income-class-specific cubic time trends.  We also 
allow for income-class-specific log real S&P 500 effects, as in Table A.31.   
Looking across columns in Table A.33, switching from the quadratic trends specification 
to either linear trends or cubic trends results in higher persistent price elasticities for all income 
groups.  For the highest income group, the persistent elasticity increases from -0.827 in the 
quadratic trends specification to -0.913 in the linear trends specification and -1.176 in the cubic 
trends specification.  Future price elasticities, however, tend to be larger with the quadratic 
trends included.  For the highest income group, the future price elasticity is 0.427 and 
statistically significant with quadratic trends, compared to 0.329 and statistically significant with 
linear trends and 0.282 and statistically insignificant with cubic trends. 
Similar results are found when log federal and log state prices are allowed to have 
different effects.  The persistent price elasticities with respect to both federal and state prices are 
generally smallest for the quadratic trends specification.  In addition, though there are some 
exceptions, future price elasticities with respect to both federal and state prices tend to be larger 
in the quadratic trends specification. 
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Table A.32– Price elasticity estimates controlling for separate linear or cubic time trends and log 
real S&P500 effects for each income class in place of year dummies, and allowing coefficients 
on all other variables to differ across income classes, using predictable tax change instruments 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










Elasticity  Income 
class 
Federal State Federal State    
-1.553 -1.118 -1.023 -0.386 -1.215 -0.698  < $100K 
(0.551)*** (0.624)*  (0.548)* (0.611)  (0.469)***  (0.474) 
-0.530 -1.181 -0.345 -0.763 -0.575 -0.444  $100K - 
$200K  (0.321)* (0.516)**  (0.354)  (0.501) (0.314)* (0.344) 
-0.691 -0.873 -0.836 -0.924 -0.637 -0.824  $200K - 
$500K  (0.197)*** (0.341)** (0.225)***  (0.331)*** (0.173)*** (0.200)*** 
-0.459 -0.438 -0.702 -0.836 -0.436 -0.748  $500K - 
$1M  (0.182)** (0.282)  (0.237)***  (0.328)** (0.161)***  (0.222)*** 





(0.122)*** (0.348)*** (0.162)*** (0.350)*** (0.105)*** (0.159)*** 
-0.245 0.133 0.357 1.359 0.161 0.787  < $100K 
(0.827) (1.178) (0.791) (1.157) (0.759) (0.734) 
0.420 -1.366 0.690 -0.161 0.365 0.623  $100K - 
$200K  (0.629) (1.296) (0.614) (1.192) (0.622) (0.608) 
-0.031 -0.224 -0.225 0.148  0.065 -0.115  $200K - 
$500K  (0.319) (0.783) (0.343) (0.723) (0.298) (0.318) 
0.449 0.601 0.254 0.303 0.504 0.255  $500K - 
$1M  (0.237)*  (0.517) (0.255) (0.520)  (0.219)**  (0.239) 





(0.159)** (0.433) (0.161)** (0.409) (0.144)**  (0.149)* 
All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnYit, ΔlnYit+1, ΔlnPit-1, ΔlnPit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and log real S&P500 index, 
each interacted with dummies for each income class, along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. 
 
M. Sensitivity to method of constructing predictable tax change instruments 
 
  In the text, we used instruments for future change in price and income based on applying 
the “predictable” future marginal and average tax rate functions to a predictions of future income 
that came from a regression of the future change in log income on the exogenous variables in our 
system that were knowable at time t. In Tables A.33 through A.35, as sensitivity analyses, we try 
using a simpler instrumental variables strategy in which the instruments for future changes in 
price and income were constructed holding real income and all inputs into the tax calculator   72
constant in real terms at their year t values, so that the variation in the instruments is driven 
entirely by the “predictable” difference between this year’s and next year’s tax functions.    
Table A.33, column (1) repeats the results reported in the main paper in Table 2 columns 
(1), (2) and (5), but with this simpler approach to constructing instruments for future price and 
income changes.  In column (2), the state persistent price elasticity estimate is almost identical, at 
-1.16 in both Table 2 and Table A.33.  The federal persistent price elasticity is a bit smaller, 
falling from -0.35 to -0.23 when the simpler instrument is used.  In column (3), using combined 
federal-state price, the persistent price elasticity is -0.52, a bit smaller than the -0.61 estimate in 
the corresponding specification in column (5) of Table 2.The persistent income elasticity, on the 
other hand, changes more significantly, increasing from 0.51 to 0.88 in the specification 
including separate federal and state prices, and from 0.60 to 0.95 in the specification with 
combined federal-state price.  Elasticities with respect to future income changes are also notably 
larger with the simpler approach to constructing instruments. 
 
Table A.33 – Alternative method of constructing predictable tax change instruments: 
specifications from Table 2 (estimates assuming coefficients are uniform across income classes) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Separate federal  
and state prices 




-0.029 0.142 -0.040  ΔlnPit-1  
(0.047) (0.080) (0.046) 
0.098 0.615 0.128  ΔlnPit 
(0.070) (0.123)***  (0.067)* 
-0.233 -1.156 -0.515  lnPit [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.210) (0.283)***  (0.223)** 
0.414 0.226 0.159  ΔlnPi,t+1 
(0.224)* (0.317)  (0.235) 
-0.053 -0.061  ΔlnYit-1 
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
-0.122 -0.138  ΔlnYit 
(0.010)*** (0.008)*** 
0.879 0.948  lnYit [persistent 
income elasticity]  (0.125)*** (0.117)*** 
0.544 0.607  ΔlnYi,t+1  (0.169)*** (0.156)*** 
All columns also control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state gov't spending. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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Table A.34 reports estimates from modifying the specification from column (5) of Table 
3 in the paper (which allowed coefficients on all non-price variables to differ by income class 
and which used combined federal-state price) to use the simpler approach to constructing 
instruments.  The persistent price elasticity is now estimated to be -1.41 with standard error of 
0.37 with the simpler instruments, compared to -1.10 with a standard error of 0.45 with the 
instruments used in the paper.  In contrast to Table A.35, persistent and future income elasticity 
estimates are not so different from those reported in Table 3 when we use the simpler method to 
constructing instruments but allow heterogeneity across income classes. 
 
Table A.34 -- Alternative method of constructing predictable tax change instruments: combined 
federal-state price specification from Table 3 (estimates allowing all coefficients on all non-price 
variables to differ across income classes) 
-1.410  Persistent price 
elasticity  (0.366)*** 
-0.442  Future price elasticity 
(0.356) 
0.563  < $100K 
(0.181)*** 
0.468  $100K - 
$200K  (0.137)*** 
0.348  $200K - 
$500K  (0.145)** 
0.348  $500K - 







0.241  < $100K 
(0.285) 
0.212  $100K - 
$200K  (0.253) 
-0.010  $200K - 
$500K  (0.352) 
-0.501  $500K - 







All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, other dependents, ln(state 
house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each interacted with dummies for 
each income class, along with fixed effects, ΔlnPit-1, and ΔlnPit,. Robust standard errors, clustered by state and 
income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table A.35 presents estimated price elasticities from specifications that allow 
heterogeneity in all parameters, including price elasticities, by income class (similar to that in 
column (5) of Table 4), but for which the alternative instruments are used.  Comparing Table 
A.35 to column (5) of Table 4, the persistent price elasticities tend to be slightly larger when the 
alterative instruments are used, but are broadly similar.   However, future price elasticities for the 
top 3 income classes are now wrong-signed, with the elasticity for millionaires estimated at a 
marginally significant and large -0.78.  This counterintuitive estimate might have arisen because 
the simpler approach to constructing instruments for future price changes does not do as good a 
job of providing an unbiased estimate of the predictable portion of a future price change. 
 
Table A.35 -- Alternative method of constructing predictable tax change instruments: combined 
federal-state price specification from Table 4 (estimates allowing coefficients on all variables 
including price to differ across income classes) 
-0.466  < $100K 
(0.543) 
-0.425  $100K - 
$200K  (0.409) 
-1.214  $200K - 
$500K  (0.355)*** 
-1.085  $500K - 







1.359  < $100K 
(0.749)* 
0.933  $100K - 
$200K  (0.683) 
-0.641  $200K - 
$500K  (0.546) 
-0.086  $500K - 







All columns also control for ΔlnYit-1, ΔlnYit, lnYit, ΔlnYit+1, ΔlnPit-1, ΔlnPit, lnP_salestax, (age/100) squared, children, 
other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, state gov't spending, and year dummies, each 
interacted with dummies for each income class, along with fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by state 
and income class, are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.   75
V. GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF VARIATION IN TIME PATHS OF STATE PRICES 
BY STATE AND INCOME CLASS 
 
  Figures A.1 and A.2 illustrate variation in the time path of state prices in all states for 
people with incomes above and below $200,000, respectively, using a procedure identical to that 
used to construct Figure 2 in the text.  The graph for each state depicts the average effect of the 
state’s income tax on the price of giving for people in that income group for each year between 
1979 and 2006, computed as the difference between combined federal-state price, and what the 
price would be if there were no state income tax. The time paths in most states with income taxes 
are similar to those depicted in Figure 2, with the commonalities arising largely due to the 
federal-state interactions discussed in the text in association with Figure 2.  States with unusual 
patterns include Louisiana and West Virginia, both of which eliminated itemized deductions 
during the sample period.  For states without an income tax (Alaska, Florida, South Dakota, 
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming), the state price is always zero. 
  Figure A.2 depicts the average effect of state income taxes on the price of giving for each 
state among people with incomes below $200,000.  Here, the variation is less dramatic, but time-
series changes in price on the order of 5 cents on the dollar are not uncommon.  Again, 
commonalities in the time paths across states arise from federal-state interactions.  For the below 
$200,000 group, one important federal-state interaction arises because of reductions in federal 
marginal tax rates over time, which increased the incremental effect of state income taxes on the 
price of charity (making the lines in Figure A.2 lower later in the period).  Another important 
factor was the federal deduction for non-itemizers that applied from 1982 through 1986.  In 1982 
and 1983, non-itemizers could deduct 25 percent of up to $100 of charity; in 1984 they could 
deduct 25 percent of up to $300 of charity; in 1985 they could deduct 50 percent of an unlimited 
amount of charity, and in 1986 they could deduct 100% of charitable donations (in all cases 
subject to the standard percentage of AGI limits).  One important way that a state income tax 
reduces the price of charity is that people who pay state income taxes are more likely to itemize 
deductions on their federal returns, which reduces the price of giving relative to comparable 
people in other states who do not itemize because they don’t pay state income taxes.  As the non-
itemizer deduction became more generous between 1982 and 1986, this factor became less 
important, which explains why state income taxes had a diminishing impact on the price of 
giving during this period in Table A.2.   76
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VI. COMPOSITION OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE BY YEAR AND INCOME 
Table A.38 shows the number of observations and mean income in the estimation sample 
by year.  Recall that we select a sample that is in the midst of a spell of at least six consecutive 
years of meeting all of our sample selection criteria (discussed in the main body of the paper), 
and then we omit the first two and last two years of data for each taxpaying unit so that we can 
have two lagged changes in price and income, future change in price and income over one or two 
future years, and so we can re-allocate carryovers from at least two future years; as a result, our 
estimation sample includes returns from the years 1981 through 2004.  In the years 1981 through 
1988, there are roughly 5,000 returns per year; all of these returns are from the 1979-1995 panel.  
That panel heavily oversampled returns that had high incomes in 1981, and hence mean income 
during those years is well over $1 million.  From 1989 through 1993, we have returns from both 
the 1979-1995 panel, and the 1987-1996 family panel (1989-1993 are the only years where two 
past and two future years of data are available for both of those panels at the same time).  In 
those years, our sample size increases dramatically to over 31,000 per year, due to the large 
cross-sectional dimension of the family panel.  In 1994, most returns from the 1979-1995 panel 
drop out (due to lack of two future years of data), and this is also the last year for which we have 
two future years of data for the vast majority of returns in the family panel.  Throughout 1989-
1994 mean income in the sample continually exceeds $1 million.  For the years 1995 through 
1999, the estimation sample only includes returns that appeared in one of the other panels, and 
continued to be sampled in the IRS Statistics of Income annual cross-sections in 1997 and 1998 
because they were part of the random subsample that was selected based on two 4-digit social 
security number endings.  In each of those years, we only have roughly 3,000 observations, and 
the mean income in each of those years ranges from 152,002 to 188,647; despite the randomness 
of the original sample of returns from which this set of returns was drawn, was the mean income 
is still relatively high because we are limiting our sample to people who would have itemized 
deductions without any charitable giving for at least six consecutive years, which selects a 
disproportionately high-income group.  In 2000, the sample size increases to 7,800 because 
starting in 1998 the IRS Statistics of Income division increased the number of 4-digit social 
security number endings that it sampled in its annual cross-sections to five, and these returns 
were followed in the 1999-2006 edited panel.   From 2001-2004, we have two lagged years and 
two future years of data for the vast majority of returns in the 1999 – 2006 edited panel, so we   79
have a much larger sample in the vicinity of 20,000 returns in each of those years, and the mean 
income is around $3 million to $4 million.  Table A.39 shows the number of returns in our 
estimation sample that are in each class of current year pre-tax income, measured in constant 
year 2007 dollars.  The pattern of returns by income class is slightly U-shaped, and the largest 
group is millionaires, with 90,520 observations. 
 
Table A.37 – Number of observations in estimation sample and mean income by year 
Year Number  of  observations  Mean pre-tax income in constant 
year 2007 dollars 
1981    4,952   1,492,892 
1982    5,344   1,371,511 
1983    5,391   1,568,265 
1984    5,390   1,326,286 
1985    5,114   1,399,425 
1986    5,131   1,793,121 
1987    5,081   1,282,290 
1988    4,951   1,784,664 
1989   31,282   1,830,055 
1990   32,799   1,708,508 
1991   32,374   1,427,476 
1992   31,932   1,562,818 
1993   31,730   1,442,516 
1994   27,714   1,360,443 
1995    2,636   152,002 
1996    2,705   156,646 
1997    2,802   161,960 
1998    2,900   188,647 
1999    3,130   180,094 
2000    7,800   182,418 
2001   19,136   4,011,925 
2002   20,318   3,146,831 
2003   20,680   3,331,808 
2004   19,104   4,144,224 
 
Table A.38 – Composition of estimation sample by income 
Current pre-tax income, in constant year 2007 
dollars 
Number of observations
$0 - $100,000  71,713
$100,000 - $200,000  68,743
$200,000 - $500,000  56,934
$500,000 - $1 million  42,486
Over $1 million  90,520
All incomes  330,396  80
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